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SALVAGING A CAPSIZED STATUTE: PUTTING 
THE PUBLIC VESSELS ACT BACK ON COURSE 
Jefferson A. Holt* 
INTRODUCTION 
“Originally, the words of the Public Vessels Act seemed to mean 
what they said.”1 
 
The Public Vessels Act (PVA) waives federal sovereign immunity 
for, among other things, “damages caused by a public vessel of the 
United States.”2 At first sight, these words seem clear enough. But, 
under a deceivingly calm surface awaits a riptide of uncertainty and 
tangled history. Since 1916,3 Congress has enacted various statutes 
intended to waive sovereign immunity in the admiralty context.4 As a 
result, there is significant and confusing overlap between the extant 
statutes.5 On account of such overlap, the Maritime Law Association 
of the United States (MLAUS) in 1983 recommended that Congress 
repeal the PVA.6 Despite such a credible call for reform, nearly thirty 
years later the statute remains.7 
																																																																																																																																
 *  J.D. Candidate, 2013, Georgia State University College of Law. With sincere gratitude to those 
who helped guide me and this project along the way; thank you for forcing me to think harder and write 
better every day. And with love to all of my family—especially my wife Lana and our son Tucker—for 
their inimitable patience, encouragement, and support. 
 1. Marine Coatings of Ala. v. United States, 71 F.3d 1558, 1562 (11th Cir. 1996).  
 2. 46 U.S.C. §§ 31101–31112 (2006). 
 3. Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, 39 Stat. 728 (repealed 1996 with select provisions currently 
codified in 46 U.S.C.). 
 4. See generally United States v. United Cont’l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164 (1976); THOMAS J. 
SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 861–70 (2d ed. 1994); Fritz G. Faerber, Admiralty 
Claims Against the United States, 20 F. 122 (1985). 
 5. See, e.g., Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding claim alleging 
negligence of Coast Guard crew in interdiction, search, and towage of fishing vessel to fall within the 
scope of the PVA); Uralde v. United States, 614 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding claim 
alleging negligence of Coast Guard crew members in application of medical care during interdiction at 
sea to be governed by the Suits in Admiralty Act). 
 6. COMM. ON MAR. LEGISLATION OF THE MAR. LAW ASS’N OF THE U.S., DOCUMENT NO. 646, 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REPEAL OF THE PUBLIC VESSELS ACT AND AMENDMENT OF THE SUITS IN 
ADMIRALTY ACT (1983) [hereinafter REPEAL], available at http://www.mlaus.org (select “Library” 
hyperlink; then “Numbered MLA Historical Documents” hyperlink); see also Peter Child Nosek, 
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Today, the scope of the PVA’s “damages caused by a public 
vessel” provision (“Damages Provision”) is uncertain.8 In particular, 
it is unclear whether the claimed damages must be a direct result of 
the negligent operation or navigation of the public vessel, or if the 
mere involvement of a public vessel is sufficient to trigger the PVA’s 
waiver of sovereign immunity.9 It is also unclear whether the PVA 
should be limited to those contract claims expressly enumerated 
within its provisions (i.e., towage and salvage claims),10 or whether 
plaintiffs can also entertain general contract claims involving public 
vessels under the Damages Provision.11 The Supreme Court on two 
occasions intimated that a generally broad construction of the PVA is 
proper.12 However, the Court’s decisions do not establish a clear and 
definitive standard.13 
As a result of the Supreme Court’s reticence, the circuit courts—
led by the divergent views of the Ninth and Eleventh circuits—differ 
as to the scope of the Damages Provision.14 The Ninth Circuit 
																																																																																																																																
Unifying Maritime Claims Against the United States: A Proposal to Repeal the Suits in Admiralty Act 
and the Public Vessels Act, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 41 (1999). 
 7. See 46 U.S.C.A. § 31102 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 112-42 (excluding P.L. 112-40, 
112-41)). Admittedly, the arguments in favor of repealing the PVA are convincing. However, this Note 
presumes the statute will retain its force and does not seek to renew the calls for reform. 
 8. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 869 (recognizing that “difficult and unique questions arise 
when it comes to applying the standard of due care to certain governmental functions,” while identifying 
a discretionary function exception in the PVA). But see Taghadomi v. United States, 401 F.3d 1080, 
1088 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding a claim alleging negligent search by the crew of a Coast Guard vessel falls 
within scope of the PVA). For a summary of the factual background and reasoning in Taghadomi, see 
infra note 103. 
 9. Compare Tobar, 639 F.3d at 1198–99 (merely involved), with Uralde, 614 F.3d at 1288 (in the 
operation of). 
 10. 46 U.S.C. § 31102(a)(2) (2006). 
 11. Compare Marine Coatings of Ala. v. United States, 71 F.3d 1558 (11th Cir. 1996) (no general 
contract suits), with Thomason v. United States, 184 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1950) (opposite). 
 12. See Am. Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 454 (1947) (extending the PVA to claims for 
personal injuries caused by a public vessel when a ship’s beam fell into the hold and struck a 
longshoreman); Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 223–24 (1945) (extending the 
PVA to noncollision cases when the negligence of Naval personnel in operation of a vessel as a tow 
caused a private vessel to strike a submerged wreck); see also discussion infra Part II.C. 
 13. See, e.g., United States v. United Cont’l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 180–81 & n.21 (1976) 
(intimating no view as to whether contract claims not enumerated in the PVA may be brought under the 
act); Calmar S.S. Corp. v. United States, 345 U.S. 446, 456 n.8 (1953) (suggesting it should not be 
assumed that all contract claims may be brought under the PVA). 
 14. See Tobar, 639 F.3d at 1199 n.3 (“We recognize that the Eleventh Circuit has disagreed with our 
broad reading of the [PVA].”); Marine Coatings, 71 F.3d at 1563–64 (identifying the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation as “by far the broadest reading any court has given the PVA”). 
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construes the PVA broadly and permits suit for all damages, 
sounding in contract or tort, which arise out of the operation of a 
public vessel.15 In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit construes the statute 
strictly: a contract claim must be of the type enumerated in the 
PVA,16 and a tort claim must involve damages caused by the 
operation or navigation of a public vessel or by the public vessel 
itself.17 A recent Ninth Circuit opinion18 brings this split of authority 
to the fore and invites a resolution to establish reliability and 
consistency across the circuits. 
This Note considers the waiver of federal sovereign immunity in 
the admiralty context and attempts to define the proper and intended 
scope of the PVA. Part I briefly introduces sovereign immunity and 
admiralty law generally, reviews the history of the United States’ 
waiver of sovereign immunity in the admiralty context, and analyzes 
the decisions creating the circuit split.19 Part II considers the statute 
in context, applies rules of statutory interpretation, reconsiders 
relevant Supreme Court precedent and the legislative record, and 
briefly considers important policy implications of the alternative 
interpretations.20 Part III proposes a solution that, rather than 
advocating repeal of the PVA, employs a strict interpretation of its 
terms and promotes coherent application in harmony with the Suits in 
Admiralty Act (SAA).21 
																																																																																																																																
 15. Tobar, 639 F.3d at 1198–99 (negligent search and towage of fishing vessel by Coast Guard); 
Thomason, 184 F.2d at 107–08 (wage claims of seamen working aboard public vessel). 
 16. Only towage and salvage claims are expressly enumerated in the PVA waiver. 46 U.S.C. 
§ 31102(a)(2) (2006). 
 17. Uralde v. United States, 614 F.3d 1282, 1286–87 (11th Cir. 2010) (alleged negligence of Coast 
Guard crew while aboard interdicted private vessel not justiciable under PVA); Marine Coatings, 71 
F.3d at 1563–64 (maritime lien claim outside scope of PVA). 
 18. Tobar, 639 F.3d 1191. 
 19. See discussion infra Part I. 
 20. See discussion infra Part II. 
 21. 46 U.S.C. §§ 30901–30918 (2006); see discussion infra Part III. For a similar but more narrowly 
defined discussion of the PVA published shortly before this Note went to print, see generally Kenneth P. 
Raley III, Comment, The Public Vessels Act and Maritime Injustice: Provi[di]ng Redress to Deserving 
Foreign Admiralty Tort Victims, 10 LOY. MAR. L.J. 429 (2012) (analyzing only the Damages Provision 
of the PVA and proposing a strict construction in situations where government agents cause injury to 
foreign individuals or their property while aboard a private vessel). 
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I. FIRST PRINCIPLES: SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND ADMIRALTY LAW 
A. Sovereign Immunity: American As Apple Pie? 
Sovereign immunity is based in the English common law maxim 
“the king himself can do no wrong.”22 Despite the lack of any direct 
reference to federal sovereign immunity in the Constitution,23 it is 
hornbook law that the United States cannot be sued without its 
consent.24 Chief Justice Marshall recognized: “[t]he universally 
received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted 
against the United States.”25 The Supreme Court has since refined 
this opinion to reflect the principle that “the United States cannot be 
lawfully sued without its consent in any case.”26 Thus, explicit 
waiver of sovereign immunity is a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction 
in suits against the government.27 Despite its entrenchment in modern 
law, the doctrine is not without critics.28 Some scholars argue 
sovereign immunity is irreconcilable with American ideals and is 
thus unconstitutional.29 Others find support for the doctrine in the 
																																																																																																																																
 22. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *244. Justice Holmes explained sovereign immunity 
in terms his post-enlightenment audience would better appreciate: “[a] sovereign is exempt from suit, 
not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that 
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.” 
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 352 (1907). 
 23. However, the notion of sovereign immunity was not lost on the Founders; Alexander Hamilton 
wrote: “it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without 
its consent. This is the general sense, and the general practice of mankind . . . .” THE FEDERALIST NO. 
81, at 450 (Alexander Hamilton) (George Stade ed., 2006). 
 24. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (“It is elementary that the United States, 
as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued, and the terms of its consent to be sued 
in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit. A waiver of sovereign immunity cannot 
be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Roberts v. United 
States, 498 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir. 1974) (“It is axiomatic that Congressional waiver of sovereign 
immunity is a prerequisite to any suit brought against the United States . . . .”). 
 25. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411–12 (1821). 
 26. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204 (1882). 
 27. Mitchell, 445 U.S. at 538. 
 28. Indeed, some commentators contest the original premise as vague. Does “the King can do no 
wrong” mean that the king is infallible and thus someone else must be guilty, or that a remedy must 
exist because it would be wrong for the King to allow injury to pass without some form of recompense 
to the victim? Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1201 & n.1 
(2001). 
 29. Id. at 1201–02 (insisting that “the entire doctrine should be eliminated from American law” 
because it conflicts with American rejection of monarchical prerogatives, undermines commitment to 
the rule of law, and denies recovery to deserving plaintiffs); James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and 
4
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Supremacy Clause.30 Either way, even its detractors admit sovereign 
immunity is here to stay.31 
Also, scholars and judges alike disagree about how to construe 
waivers of sovereign immunity.32 Traditionally, courts strictly 
construed such waivers,33 but some modern courts employ a more 
liberal approach.34 Recent Supreme Court decisions seem to favor a 
strict construction limiting government liability.35 In the end, an 
understanding of basic sovereign immunity principles only begins the 
inquiry; the peculiar nature of admiralty law must also inform any 
court’s consideration of the proper scope of the PVA. 
																																																																																																																																
the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the 
Government, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 899, 990 (1997) (recognizing “the Petition Clause [of the Constitution] 
as an affirmation of the Blackstonian right to seek judicial redress from government wrongdoing” and 
concluding that “[s]overeign immunity has no place in such a body of law”); see also Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the 
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”). 
 30. See John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear Statement Rules, 
1995 WIS. L. REV. 771, 776–77 & n.27; see also Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 
U.S. 682, 704 (1949) (“There are the strongest reasons of public policy for the rule that such relief 
cannot be had against the sovereign. The Government as representative of the community as a whole, 
cannot be stopped in its tracks by any plaintiff who presents a disputed question of property or contract 
right.”). 
 31. Chemerinsky, supra note 28, at 1203 (“I do not foresee the Supreme Court eliminating sovereign 
immunity any time soon. The trend, unquestionably, is in the opposite direction.”). 
 32. See Nagle, supra note 30, at 778–80 (discussing in detail the two distinct and conflicting lines of 
Supreme Court cases addressing interpretation of sovereign immunity waivers). 
 33. See, e.g., Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (stating that a waiver of sovereign immunity 
“will be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign”); Soriano v. United States, 
352 U.S. 270, 276–77 (1957) (“[L]imitations and conditions upon which the Government consents to be 
sued must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied.”); Blevins v. United States, 
769 F.2d 175, 181 (4th Cir. 1985) (“A waiver of sovereign immunity by implication is not favored; ‘it 
must be express, and it must be strictly construed.’” (quoting Arvin v. United States, 742 F.2d 1301, 
1302 (11th Cir. 1984))). 
 34. United Cont’l Tuna Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 1974) (noting the 
“modern view which liberally construes waivers of governmental immunity”), rev’d, 425 U.S. 164 
(1976); see also Larson, 337 U.S. at 723 (suggesting that in the post-New Deal era sovereign immunity 
is disfavored); Anderson v. John L. Hayes Constr. Co., 153 N.E. 28, 29–30 (N.Y. 1926) (finding enough 
hardship where consent to suit is withheld and suggesting such hardship should not be compounded to 
by an unduly strict construction of any granted waiver). 
 35. Nagle, supra note 30, at 774 (noting five Supreme Court cases from the 1990s finding against 
waiver and establishing a rule that “purpose, the legislative history, or a plausible reading of an 
ambiguous statute carries no weight in the sovereign immunity inquiry if the text of a statute does not 
plainly waive federal sovereign immunity from the claim presented in the case”). 
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B. A Primer: Admiralty Law Generally 
Admiralty law is steeped in tradition and custom.36 The ship itself 
is often personified by the law37 and, at times, represents both the 
source and the limit of liability.38 Aware of both the peculiar nature 
of admiralty law and the importance of maritime commerce to the 
nascent American Experiment, the Founders integrated the centuries-
old body of traditional maritime law into their new government.39 
The Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial Power shall 
extend . . . to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”40 The 
Judiciary Act of 1789 granted original jurisdiction to the district 
courts and today is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1333.41 The original 
																																																																																																																																
 36. “Maritime law is as old as maritime commerce.” STEVEN L. SNELL, COURTS OF ADMIRALTY 
AND THE COMMON LAW: ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT IN CONCURRENT JURISDICTION 50 
(2007). The first known codification dates from the eighteenth century B.C.E. in the Code of 
Hammurabi. Id. As far as it can be traced, maritime law reveals customs of ancient mariners, common 
practices with regard to the transportation of cargo by sea, and the important role for merchants and 
masters in interpreting and applying the law to provide remedies for injured parties. GERARD J. 
MANGONE, UNITED STATES ADMIRALTY LAW 37 (1997); see also Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 
U.S. 539, 551 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Our law of the sea has an ancient history. While it 
has not been static, the needs and interests of the interrelated world-wide seaborne trade which it reflects 
are very deeply rooted in the past. . . . In the law of the sea, the continuity and persistence of a 
doctrine . . . has special significance.”). For more on admiralty law across the centuries, see MANGONE, 
supra, at 1–39. 
 37. Justice Holmes wrote: “A ship is the most living of inanimate things. . . . [it is only by treating a 
ship] as if endowed with personality, that the arbitrary seeming peculiarities of the maritime law can be 
made intelligible, and on that supposition they at once become consistent and logical.” OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 26–27 (Dover Publ’ns, Inc. 1991) (1881). Chief Justice 
Marshall, considering whether a ship could be forfeited for the actions of its master, opined: “It is true, 
that inanimate matter can commit no offence. The mere wood, iron, and sails of the ship, cannot, of 
themselves, violate the law. But this body is animated and put in action by the crew . . . . The vessel acts 
and speaks by the master.” United States v. The Little Charles, 26 F. Cas. 979 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, 
C.C.D. Va. 1818) (No. 15,612). 
 38. HOLMES, supra note 37, at 30. A suit against a ship owner is brought in personam, meaning it 
seeks to adjudicate the rights of individuals rather than property. MANGONE, supra note 36, at 57; 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 862 (9th ed. 2009). On the other hand, a claim against the vessel itself is 
brought in rem. MANGONE, supra note 36, at 57. Ships are often far from their owners, and when they 
cause damage the res (or “thing”) itself may be the only remedy for an injured party. Id. In such a case, 
an action in rem may be used to attach a maritime lien to the vessel until the judgment is paid. Id. In 
some cases, a vessel may be arrested, its owner notified, and—if the claim remains unsatisfied—the ship 
will be condemned and sold. Id. 
 39. SNELL, supra note 36, at 13–25; MANGONE, supra note 36, at 38. 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. This apparent tautology is not redundancy without reason. The 
Founders intended the admiralty jurisdiction in the United States to expand beyond its traditional scope, 
and thus employed use of both “admiralty” and “maritime” to convey the broad scope of intended 
jurisdiction. MANGONE, supra note 36, at 32. 
 41. The district courts have exclusive original jurisdiction of: “Any civil case of admiralty or 
6
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purpose of admiralty jurisdiction in the United States was the 
“protection and the promotion of the maritime shipping industry.”42 
Additionally, the Founders urged a uniform body of national laws to 
regulate maritime activities because disputes with foreigners were 
likely to occur in the admiralty context.43 Despite its somewhat 
complex jurisdictional and procedural requirements,44 a reliance on 
ancient customs and convenient legal fictions,45 and some very basic 
anti-democratic tendencies,46 admiralty law purports to provide 
reliability and efficiency in the management of conflicts arising off 
the terra firma. Unfortunately, these reliability and efficiency goals 
are often frustrated when a plaintiff sues the government in 
admiralty. 
																																																																																																																																
maritime jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006). Concurrent jurisdiction exists with state courts “to the 
extent that distinctive admiralty remedies are not involved and if not prohibited by statute.” 
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 7. 
 42. Adams v. Mont. Power Co., 528 F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 43. See MANGONE, supra note 36, at 33 (summarizing admiralty debates at the Constitutional 
Convention); THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 441 (Alexander Hamilton) (George Stade ed., 2006) (“The 
most bigoted idolizers of state authority [would not] deny the national judiciary the cognizance of 
maritime causes. These so generally depend on the laws of nations, and so commonly affect the rights of 
foreigners, that they fall within the considerations . . . relative to the public peace.”). 
 44. For example, to bring a cognizable tort claim in a federal court under the admiralty jurisdiction, a 
plaintiff must satisfy the locality and nexus requirements. Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 1197 
(9th Cir. 2011). The locality requirement is satisfied when the tort occurs on or over navigable waters. 
Id. Navigable waters “are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways 
for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and 
travel on water.” The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). The necessary nexus is satisfied 
when “the actions giving rise to the tort claim . . . bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime 
activity” and have a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce. Tobar, 639 F.3d at 1197 
(quoting Taghadomi v. United States, 401 F.3d 1080, 1084 (9th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Six special problems often are encountered in admiralty practice: (1) joinder of claims and 
parties, especially when non-admiralty claims are involved; (2) a liberal application of venue provisions 
due to the “worldwide sphere” of admiralty jurisdiction; (3) special provisions for appeals; (4) special 
provisions for removal from state court; (5) the unsure footing of equity—which was traditionally 
unavailable—in modern admiralty courts; and (6) “special statutes and rules . . . in the area of sovereign 
immunity.” SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 8–10. 
 45. See supra notes 36–38. 
 46. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 47–48 (2004) (discussing American colonists’ 
negative reaction to the assignment of Stamp Act jurisdiction to the admiralty courts, where private 
judicial examination often bypassed basic confrontation rights); Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 
U.S. 539, 550 (1960). (“No area of federal law is judge-made at its source to such an extent as is the law 
of admiralty.”); SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 925–30 (identifying four occasions upon which a jury 
trial might be afforded an admiralty litigant, while noting a general rule that the Seventh Amendment 
right to a trial by jury is not guaranteed in admiralty). 
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C. Sovereign Immunity In The Admiralty Context 
The United States waived its general tort immunity in 1946 with 
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).47 Other statutes, including the 
Tucker Act,48 combine with the FTCA to offer plaintiffs injured by 
the government access to the courts.49 Though some confusion 
remains, the FTCA and other land-based waivers do not extend to 
claims once admiralty jurisdiction is established.50 Once admiralty 
jurisdiction is invoked, either the PVA or the SAA applies.51 But, it 
can be difficult to determine which of the two statutes applies. Here, 
past is indeed prologue; the present statutory scheme is more an 
accident of history than a carefully considered and comprehensive 
plan for waiving sovereign immunity.52 
A formal waiver of sovereign immunity in the admiralty context 
first appeared in the early twentieth century.53 Before then, injured 
plaintiffs either petitioned Congress for private bills or brought suit 
against government officers in their personal capacities.54 When sued 
directly, officers could then seek indemnification by presenting a 
private bill in Congress.55 This approach maintained the legal fiction 
																																																																																																																																
 47. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680 (2006); MARC A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L. RABIN & MICHAEL 
D. GREEN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 251 (8th ed. 2006). 
 48. Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 505. Provisions of the Tucker Act are presently codified at 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (2006), including a grant of original jurisdiction to the Court of Federal 
Claims for, among other things, certain non-tort civil actions founded in express or implied contracts 
with the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2006). 
 49. See generally Brian R. Levey, Tortious Government Conduct and the Government Contract: 
Tort, Breach of Contract, or Both?, 22 PUB. CONT. L.J. 706, 712–19 (1993); Allyson Cook, Comment, 
The Suits in Admiralty Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act: Bridging the Gap Between Congressional 
Intent and Judicial Interpretation, 16 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 119 (2004). 
 50. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 862 n.8 (discussing interplay of the various waivers). 
 51. Id. Though there are some exceptions, such as when another statute provides an exclusive 
remedy for federal employees. See infra notes 134–35. 
 52. For more discussion of the interplay among the waivers of sovereign immunity within the 
admiralty context, see generally, Faerber, supra note 4, and George Rutherglen, Sovereign Immunity, 31 
J. MAR. L. & COM. 317 (2000). 
 53. United States v. United Cont’l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 170 (1976) (“Prior to 1916, the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity barred any suit by a private owner whose vessel was damaged by a 
vessel owned or operated by the United States.”). 
 54. Nosek, supra note 6, at 42; James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private 
Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 
1872–76 (2010). 
 55. Pfander & Hunt, supra note 54, at 1872–76. Two notable indemnification cases arose during the 
Quasi War with France. See generally Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S (2 Cranch) 64 
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of sovereign immunity and preserved separation of powers, while 
also protecting officers from catastrophic liability and ensuring 
compensation for victims.56 Leaders of the early Republic easily 
managed this practice;57 but as the United States and its fleet grew, 
the number of requests for indemnification quickly became 
unmanageable.58 
In response, Congress passed the Shipping Act of 1916.59 The Act 
exposed the government to liability when a merchant vessel owned or 
operated by the government allegedly caused injury to a plaintiff if a 
private party would be liable under similar circumstances.60 Though 
Congress did not intend a literal interpretation,61 the Supreme Court 
																																																																																																																																
(1804); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). Despite the proper motives and good faith of 
the captains, the plaintiffs received sizable judgments in both cases. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S at 125–26; 
Little, 6 U.S. at 175, 179. Thereafter, both captains obtained private bills to cover their liability. See Act 
for Relief of Alexander Murray, ch. 12, 6 Stat. 56 (1805); Act for the Relief of George Little, ch. 4, 6 
Stat. 63 (1807). For detailed discussion of these and other early petitions for private bills, see Pfander & 
Hunt, supra note 54, at 1872–76. 
 56. See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 54, at 1872–76. The private bill indemnification process was an 
important administrative mechanism in the early Republic used to address both admiralty and non-
admiralty claims against the government and its officials. Id. at 1862, 1904, 1929–31. Though a return 
to the practice is unlikely, the lessons of the system with regard to risk allocation and compensation for 
harm caused by the government remain relevant today. Id. at 1930. 
 57. A study of Congressional records between 1789 and 1860 found fifty-seven petitions for 
indemnification filed by government officers. Id. at 1904. 
 58. In 1925, the Senate Claims Committee recognized some eighty claims and more than 450 
collisions involving government-owned vessels in private service over a three-year period. REPEAL, 
supra note 6, at 7642 (citing S. REP. NO. 68-941, at 3, 9, 10, 14, 17–23 (1925)). 
 59. Marine Coatings of Ala. v. United States, 71 F.3d 1558, 1559 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing World 
War I as stimulus for a growing federal fleet and the Shipping Act as Congress’s response to the 
increasing volume of private claims). 
 60. The Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, 39 Stat. 728 (repealed 1996 with select provisions currently 
codified in 46 U.S.C.) (“Every vessel purchased, chartered, or leased from [the United States] . . . while 
employed solely as merchant vessels shall be subject to all laws, regulations, and liabilities governing 
merchant vessels, whether the United States be interested therein as owner, in whole or in part, or hold 
any mortgage, lien, or other interest therein.”); Nosek, supra note 6, at 42–43. Today, the important 
distinction is whether a vessel is a public vessel. See discussion infra Part II.C.3 (discussing the 1960 
amendments to the SAA). A public vessel is one “owned and operated by the United States . . . unless it 
is engaged in transporting cargo for hire for private shippers.” Blevins v. United States, 769 F.2d 175, 
180 (4th Cir. 1985) (quoting In re Oskar Tiedemann & Co., 236 F. Supp. 895, 911 (D. Del. 1964)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also 46 U.S.C. § 2101(24)(A)–(B) (2006) (defining “public 
vessel” as one that is “owned, or demise chartered, and operated by the United States Government or a 
government of a foreign country; and is not engaged in commercial service”). Public vessels include 
“warships and coast guard rescue craft.” SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 868 n.29. But a vessel owned 
by a private party and time chartered to the United States for the carriage of cargo would not be 
considered a public vessel. Williams v. Cent. Gulf Lines, 874 F.2d 1058, 1060 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 61. Nosek, supra note 6, at 43. 
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in 1919 authorized actions in rem (as permitted under the laws 
governing private vessels) against government ships operating as 
merchant vessels.62 Cognizant of the cost and inefficiency of 
exposing government ships to seizure in proceedings in rem, 
Congress again decided to act.63 
The SAA, enacted in 1920,64 permitted suits in both tort and 
contract but did not waive sovereign immunity for damages caused 
by a public vessel operating outside the merchant trade.65 Before its 
enactment, MLAUS suggested that the SAA also waive immunity for 
damages caused by government-owned public vessels.66 Congress 
rejected such a broad waiver as a “radical change” that might 
“materially delay passage.”67 The SAA as originally passed thus 
prohibited proceedings in rem against government vessels and 
authorized suits in personam against government ships subject to suit 
as merchant vessels.68 Five years later, Congress passed the PVA, 
waiving sovereign immunity for “damages caused by a public vessel” 
and certain enumerated contract claims.69 
Congress eventually amended the SAA in 1960 to cure 
jurisdictional problems faced by plaintiffs with admiralty claims 
																																																																																																																																
 62. The Lake Monroe, 250 U.S. 246, 249 (1919) (stating that “because at the time of the collision 
she [the Lake Monroe, a government steam vessel] was employed solely as a merchant vessel . . . she 
was subject to arrest on process in rem to answer for the collision”). Cf. The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 
419, 430–33 (1922) (holding that a ship manned by Navy crew and delivering foodstuffs to Europe after 
World War I was a public vessel and thus exempt from suit). 
 63. United States v. United Cont’l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 170 (1976). The Supreme Court 
decided The Lake Monroe on June 2, 1919. Congress took up the issue with uncharacteristic speed and, 
on September 27, 1919, the Committee on Commerce stated its objections to the result in The Lake 
Monroe: 
The result of [The Lake Monroe] is to subject the United States to unnecessary 
expense and its vessels to great delays. . . . The principal object of suits in rem is to insure 
the collection of the claim by subjecting the vessel to it. It is not necessary in the case of 
the United States . . . . 
S. REP. NO. 66-223, at 3 (1919). 
 64. Suits in Admiralty Act, Pub. L. No. 66-156, 41 Stat. 525 (1920) (amended 1960). 
 65. E.S.S. Lines, Inc. v. United States, 187 F.2d 956, 960 (1st Cir. 1951). 
 66. MAR. LAW ASS’N OF THE U.S., DOCUMENT NO. 84, at 3–6 (Dec. 6, 1918), available at 
http://www.mlaus.org (select “Library” hyperlink; then “Numbered MLA Historical Documents” 
hyperlink). 
 67. H.R. REP. No. 66-497, at 4 (1919). 
 68. § 2, 41 Stat. at 525–26. 
 69. 46 U.S.C. § 31102 (2006). 
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against the government.70 First, in an attempt to consolidate all 
claims cognizable in admiralty against the United States outside the 
scope of the PVA under the SAA, Congress broadened the SAA 
waiver to permit suit where a claim would lie “if a private person or 
property were involved.”71 This language replaced the confusing 
provision previously permitting waiver only when suits would be 
maintainable if the vessel or cargo were privately owned, operated or 
possessed.72 Second, and most importantly, Congress eliminated the 
requirement that a government vessel be “employed as a merchant 
vessel” (“Merchant Vessel Proviso”), deleting these words from the 
SAA.73 After the amendment, if admiralty jurisdiction is established 
and the PVA does not apply, suit must be brought under the SAA.74 
D. PVA Or SAA: Does It Make Any Difference? 
Both the PVA and SAA authorize proceedings in personam against 
the United States in admiralty.75 Under either statute, a vessel or 
cargo of the United States may not be arrested or seized.76 Neither 
permits a jury trial.77 Under both statutes, a two-year statute of 
limitations applies.78 Venue is similar, though the SAA requires 
plaintiffs to bring suit in a district court where “any plaintiff resides 
or has its principal place of business; or [where] the vessel or cargo is 
found,”79 while the PVA allows for venue in any district where “any 
																																																																																																																																
 70. See Suits in Admiralty Act, Pub. L. 86-770, 74 Stat. 912 (1960). For example, courts required 
plaintiffs with contract claims sounding in admiralty to bring suit in the Court of Claims under the 
Tucker Act in certain circumstances. United States v. United Cont’l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 172–73 
(1976). Because of uncertainty as to the scope of the SAA and the Tucker Act, however, the choice of a 
proper forum under one act or the other was difficult. Id. at 172–78. To further complicate things, cases 
could not be filed concurrently in the Court of Claims and the district court or transferred from one to 
the other, and discovery of an unwise choice of forum often came too late for a new action to be filed. 
Id. at 173. 
 71. § 3, 74 Stat. at 912. 
 72. § 2, 41 Stat. at 525–26. 
 73. Compare § 2, 41 Stat. at 525–26, with § 3, 74 Stat. 912; see also infra Table 1 (detailing some of 
the key differences between the PVA and the SAA in table format). 
 74. United Cont’l Tuna, 425 U.S. at 178–81; SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 862, 867. 
 75. 46 U.S.C. §§ 30905, 31102(a) (2006). 
 76. §§ 30908, 31103. 
 77. §§ 30903(b), 31103. 
 78. §§ 30905, 31103. 
 79. § 30906. But where does venue lie for a nonresident with no local office when the vessel or 
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plaintiff resides or has an office . . . ; or if no plaintiff [is a 
resident] . . . the action may be brought in . . . any district.”80 
Despite many similarities, including a discretionary function 
exception,81 the PVA and the SAA vary in significant ways. The 
statutes are at odds regarding interest: the SAA allows costs and post-
filing, pre-judgment interest,82 while the PVA does not permit pre-
judgment interest unless provided for by contract.83 The PVA 
prohibits subpoena of a public vessel officer or crewmember without 
the consent of, among others, the “master or commanding officer of 
the vessel.”84 Most significantly, the PVA includes a reciprocity 
requirement; the SAA does not.85 For a noncitizen to bring suit under 
the PVA, the noncitizen’s native government must also allow suit by 
American citizens under similar circumstances.86 
Which statute applies is a matter of significant consequence. In 
short, when an admiralty claim involves a public vessel and damages 
																																																																																																																																
cargo cannot be found in any district? See Kulukundis v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 477, 478 (Ct. Cl. 
1955) (holding that the SAA was not intended to deny jurisdiction to nonresident though venue may 
prove uncertain). 
 80. § 31104. That a nonresident plaintiff may bring suit in any district under the PVA is but another 
reason a consistent interpretation is necessary. See discussion infra Part II.E. 
 81. Most courts apply a discretionary function exception in the admiralty context. See, e.g., Limar 
Shipping Ltd. v. United States, 324 F.3d 1, 6–7 & n.3 (1st Cir. 2003) (SAA); United States Fire Ins. Co. 
v. United States, 806 F.2d 1529, 1534–35 (11th Cir. 1986) (PVA); see also SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, 
at 869. The discretionary function exception seeks to “prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’ of legislative 
and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of 
an action in tort.” United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 
U.S. 797, 814 (1984). Cf. Donald S. Ingraham, Note, The Suits in Admiralty Act and the Implied 
Discretionary Function, 1982 DUKE L.J. 146 (1982). 
 82. § 30911. 
 83. § 31107. Under § 31107, a private party found jointly liable with the United States may be liable 
for interest while the government is not, even though the same standard of care applies. SCHOENBAUM, 
supra note 4, at 869. 
 84. § 31110. 
 85. See § 31111; SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 868. 
 86. § 31111. It is uncertain whether plaintiffs bear the burden of proof in establishing reciprocity. In 
any event, it appears the courts have discretion to inquire into the content of foreign law in considering 
the reciprocity element. See, e.g., Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2011). The 
reciprocity provision of the PVA is strictly applied and often results in dismissal of cases governed by 
its terms. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 868. In United Continental Tuna, after remand from the 
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit determined a foreign corporation was not an American shipowner, 
despite the fact that United States citizens owned ninety-nine percent of its stock. United Cont’l Tuna 
Corp. v. United States, 550 F.2d 569, 572–75 (9th Cir. 1977). The court held the action could not stand 
because there was no evidence that Philippine law would allow suit by an American citizen under 
similar circumstances. Id. 
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fall within the PVA, the PVA and select provisions of the SAA 
apply.87 Inconsistencies resolve in favor of the PVA.88 When a public 
vessel is not involved or the damages fall outside the scope of the 
PVA, the SAA governs exclusively.89 But more difficult than sorting 
through how the two statutes are applied is determining when one or 
the other is triggered. Decisions of the Ninth and Eleventh circuits 
demonstrate this difficulty.90 
E. The Circuit Split: A Matter Of Interpretation 
Several cases provide paradigmatic examples of the varying 
interpretations of the PVA’s Damages Provision. The Ninth Circuit 
in Tobar v. United States applied a broad interpretation when it 
considered a case involving a Coast Guard interdiction at sea.91 The 
Eleventh Circuit faced similar facts in Uralde v. United States but 
reached a markedly different result.92 Additionally, Marine Coatings 
of Alabama v. United States provides another useful glimpse into the 
Eleventh Circuit’s more plausible strict construction of the PVA.93 
1. The Ninth Circuit: Tobar v. United States (2011)94 
On October 5, 2005, a United States Coast Guard crew 
encountered an Ecuadorian fishing vessel in international waters near 
the Galapagos Islands.95 Suspicious that the fishermen were 
trafficking in illegal narcotics, the Coast Guard crew boarded the 
fishing vessel and, after contacting officials in Ecuador, towed the 
																																																																																																																																
 87. § 31103. Aside from the immunity waiver, provisions of the SAA that are not inconsistent with 
the PVA are said to be “incorporated” into the PVA. See infra note 123. 
 88. § 31103. 
 89. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 862. 
 90. See, e.g., Tobar, 639 F.3d 1191; Uralde v. United States, 614 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2010); Marine 
Coatings of Ala. v. United States, 71 F.3d 1558 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 91. See generally Tobar, 639 F.3d 1191. 
 92. See generally Uralde, 614 F.3d 1282. 
 93. See generally Marine Coatings, 71 F.3d 1558. 
 94. See also Thomason v. United States, 184 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1950) (considering a wage suit under 
the PVA). Thomason is discussed infra text accompanying notes 168–69 and provides useful contrast 
alongside the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Marine Coatings. 
 95. Tobar, 639 F.3d at 1194. 
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vessel back to Ecuador.96 No illegal narcotics were discovered and no 
criminal charges were filed.97 The fishermen later filed suit against 
the United States, claiming roughly $5 million in damages for 
“unlawful imprisonment, humiliation, pain and suffering, destruction 
of personal property, loss of their catch, loss of the use of the vessel, 
and public ridicule.”98 The district court dismissed the action 
because, in part,99 the plaintiffs failed to establish reciprocity by 
showing that Ecuador would permit similar suits by U.S. citizens.100 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded the plaintiffs’ claims were 
damages caused by a public vessel so that the PVA, and not the SAA, 
should apply.101 In the end, the court remanded the case to the district 
court to re-examine whether reciprocity exists under Ecuadorian 
law.102 Citing the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the PVA 
and its own recent holding in Taghadomi v. United States,103 the 
																																																																																																																																
 96. Id. For an interesting discussion of interdiction and illicit drugs on the high seas, see Juliana 
Gonzalez-Pinto, Interdiction of Narcotics in International Waters, 15 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
443, 448–57 (2008) (identifying the Constitution, a variety of statutes, and bilateral agreements with 
other countries as sources of authority for interdiction at sea). 
 97. Tobar, 639 F.3d at 1194. 
 98. Id. 
 99. The court also rejected other proffered grounds for finding a waiver of sovereign immunity: the 
SAA (discretionary function triggered), the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (not 
ratified by United States), the Alien Tort Claims Act (no waiver on its face), a treaty between Ecuador 
and the United States (same), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (not self-
executing and no implementing legislation). See Tobar v. United States, No. 07CV817 WQH (WMc), 
2008 WL 4350539, at *4–8 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2008). 
 100. Id. at *5. 
 101. Tobar, 639 F.3d at 1198–99. 
 102. Id. at 1200. 
 103. In Taghadomi, a husband and wife honeymooning on Maui set out upon the ocean in a kayak. 
Taghadomi v. United States, 401 F.3d 1080, 1082 (9th Cir. 2005). Rough waters threw the wife into the 
ocean. Id. A shark attacked her and she later died; meanwhile, her husband washed ashore and was 
stranded on an island for three days. Id. A bystander called the Coast Guard to report the incident. Id. A 
search ensued, but the Coast Guard crew quickly abandoned its efforts. Id. The plaintiffs—the husband, 
his wife’s estate, and her parents—sued the United States claiming wrongful death and emotional 
distress, alleging that the Coast Guard was negligent in failing to execute the rescue. Id. The district 
court determined the claims fell within admiralty but dismissed the actions, filed more than two years 
after the incident, as time-barred under the PVA and SAA. Taghadomi v. Extreme Sports Maui, 257 F. 
Supp. 2d 1262, 1271–73 (D. Haw. 2002). The claims were also barred because of lacking reciprocity; 
the wife and her parents were Iranian citizens and stipulated that Iran does not permit PVA-like claims. 
Id. at 1272. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the United States. Taghadomi, 
401 F.3d at 1090. Although the claims were ultimately barred by time or lacking reciprocity, the Ninth 
Circuit noted the “negligent-search claim thus falls within the scope of the PVA.” Id. at 1088. The value 
of this case as precedent for a broad construction of the PVA is questionable. The court itself states: 
“We need not limn the precise contours of the PVA, however, because the claims will turn out to be 
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Ninth Circuit stated “the relevant operation of the vessel here is not 
simply the movements of the public vessel itself; the relevant 
operation is the Coast Guard’s search and seizure of Plaintiffs’ vessel 
on the high seas.”104 Noting the Eleventh Circuit’s disagreement with 
its expansive construction, the three-judge panel, saying nothing of 
reason or plain meaning, concluded precedent bound it to a broad 
interpretation of the PVA.105 
2. Eleventh Circuit Decisions 
a. Uralde v. United States (2010) 
In Uralde, a husband and wife aboard a speedboat with several 
other Cuban nationals attempted to enter the United States 
illegally.106 The Coast Guard dispatched a vessel to interdict the 
speedboat, and a Coast Guard crewmember shot the engine of the 
speedboat twice.107 As the rounds hit the engine, the vessel jolted and 
the wife’s head struck the speedboat.108 When the crew came aboard, 
the wife was bleeding and unconscious.109 Thereafter, the Coast 
Guard crewmembers requested permission to airlift the wife for 
medical assistance, but land-based Coast Guard officers denied the 
request.110 Eventually, medical assistance arrived and transported the 
wife on an inflatable raft toward land, but she died while in transit.111 
The husband sued, alleging the Coast Guard made negligent 
decisions regarding medical treatment and transportation and 
claiming jurisdiction should be grounded in the FTCA or, 
alternatively, the SAA.112 In response to the United States’ motion to 
dismiss, the district court held the claim “fell under the PVA, rather 
																																																																																																																																
barred whether they arise under the PVA or not.” Id. at 1088 n.9. 
 104. Tobar, 639 F.3d at 1199. 
 105. Id. at 1199 n.3. 
 106. Uralde v. United States, 614 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Uralde, 614 F.3d at 1284. 
15
Holt: Salvaging a Capsized Statute: Putting the Public Vessels Act Back
Published by Reading Room, 2013
508 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:2 
than the SAA.”113 Unsatisfied Cuba would allow suit under similar 
circumstances, the court ultimately found reciprocity lacking.114 
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding the claims to be outside the 
scope of the PVA and governed instead by the SAA.115 The court 
reasoned that because no crewmembers were negligent in the 
operation of the public vessel, and the claim was one “simply 
involving public vessels,” the PVA did not apply.116 The medical 
decisions of Coast Guard crewmembers, though made during an 
interdiction on the high seas made possible by use of a public vessel, 
were not damages caused by a public vessel.117 More than a decade 
earlier, the Eleventh Circuit identified a similar distinction in a 
maritime lien claim filed against the United States.118 
b. Marine Coatings of Alabama v. United States (1996) 
After ten years of prior proceedings,119 Marine Coatings returned 
to the Eleventh Circuit in 1996 following judgment in favor of a 
plaintiff–subcontractor alleging nonpayment by the government for 
work completed on three Navy vessels.120 The judgment included 
attorney’s fees and pre-judgment interest, and the United States 
sought to avoid the pre-judgment interest by arguing the PVA (and 
its “no interest” proviso) should apply.121 In its analysis, the Eleventh 
Circuit focused on the PVA’s scope and “the nature of [the] 
claim.”122 Despite the government’s insistence that any claim brought 
on in rem liability principles was incorporated into the PVA,123 the 
																																																																																																																																
 113. Id. at 1283–84. 
 114. Id. at 1284–85. 
 115. Id. at 1286. 
 116. Id. at 1286–88 (quoting Marine Coatings of Ala. v. United States, 71 F.3d 1558, 1562 n.5 (11th 
Cir.1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 117. Id. at 1287. 
 118. See discussion infra Part I.E.2.b. 
 119. See, e.g., Marine Coatings, 71 F.3d at 1558, aff’g in part and rev’g in part Marine Coatings of 
Ala. v. United States, 932 F.2d 1370 (11th Cir. 1991), rev’g Marine Coatings of Ala. v. United States 
(Marine Coatings I), 674 F. Supp. 819 (S.D. Ala. 1987), on remand from Marine Coatings of Ala. v. 
United States, 792 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 120. Id. at 1559. 
 121. Id. at 1560. 
 122. Id. at 1561. 
 123. On initial remand the district court accepted this argument and held that the PVA applied to in 
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court found that the “[PVA] does not . . . apply to all maritime claims 
involving a public vessel.”124 Distinguishing the cause of damages 
here—nonpayment—from those intended to be allowed under the 
PVA, the court concluded a reading that would allow such claims 
“finds no support in the text . . . or in the purpose of the Act—even as 
that purpose has been broadly read by the Supreme Court.”125 
Significantly, the court identified the inclusion of certain contract 
claims (i.e., towage and salvage) in the PVA as excluding other 
garden-variety contract claims under the statute.126 Noting that the 
plaintiffs could rely on the SAA for relief if the PVA denied them 
recovery, the court stated “it would be a stretch to hold . . . the 
[PVA] . . . cover[s] all maritime claims, whether sounding in contract 
or in tort.”127 Although these conflicting perspectives are just the tip 
of the iceberg, the forthcoming analysis confirms that only the 
Eleventh Circuit’s analysis should survive to sail another day. 
II. MAKING SENSE OF THE PUBLIC VESSELS ACT 
As demonstrated by the current split of authority, the precise 
contours of the PVA are elusive. In fairly construing the statute, 
courts often consider many factors: the larger statutory scheme of 
sovereign immunity; canons of statutory interpretation; relevant 
Supreme Court precedent; the legislative history; policy implications; 
																																																																																																																																
personam proceedings based on in rem principles merely involving a public vessel. Marine Coatings I, 
674 F. Supp. at 823–24. Thus, the court held suit could be brought under either the PVA or the SAA and 
also suggested that “all actions against public vessels would be brought under the [PVA], subject to its 
special limitations,” seemingly without regard to the nature of the claim. Id. If a public vessel was 
involved, the PVA and incorporated provisions of the SAA should apply. If a public vessel was not 
involved, the SAA alone should apply. But, this simple syllogism oversimplifies the district court’s 
rationale. In sum, the court stated that the Supreme Court’s decision in Canadian Aviator v. United 
States incorporated “[§ 30907 of the SAA] into the [PVA], permitting in rem theories of liability to be 
asserted under the latter Act.” Id. The court continued, reasoning that § 30903, the SAA general waiver 
of liability, “should also be incorporated into the [PVA]” through § 31103 of the PVA because it is no 
more inconsistent than § 30907 of the SAA. Id. Such incorporation would, if the Eleventh Circuit had 
agreed, bring all admiralty claims involving public vessels, regardless of their nature (i.e., tort or 
contract, in the operation of the vessel or otherwise), under the PVA. See id. 
 124. Marine Coatings, 71 F.3d at 1561. 
 125. Id. at 1563–64; see also discussion infra Part II.C. 
 126. Marine Coatings, 71 F.3d at 1564. 
 127. Id. at 1564 & n.8. 
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and persuasive precedent from domestic and international 
jurisdictions.128 Careful analysis of these common factors reveals that 
a broad construction of the PVA is, if not improper, at least 
unnecessary.129 The better approach lies in a strict construction—
applying the PVA in the shadow of the more general SAA—to 
promote consistency and restore reliability across American 
jurisdictions.130 
A. Overall Statutory Scheme: One Or The Other! 
Because the PVA does not stand alone as the sole waiver of 
sovereign immunity in the admiralty context, it must be considered 
alongside its “sister statute,” the SAA.131 In opening the courthouse 
doors to suits in admiralty against the government, Congress—wisely 
or unwisely—passed several statutes.132 In construing this scheme, a 
court must intelligently and fairly work the PVA “into the entire 
statutory system of remedies against the Government to make a 
workable, consistent and equitable whole.”133 In Johansen v. United 
States, the Supreme Court denied jurisdiction under the PVA to 
civilian seamen serving aboard public vessels seeking compensation 
for damages sustained during employment.134 The Court reasoned 
that, despite the occurrence of a personal injury aboard a public 
vessel, the Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA)135 
																																																																																																																																
 128. See, e.g., Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2011) (considering many of these 
factors); Marine Coatings, 71 F.3d 1558 (same). 
 129. See discussion infra Part II.A–E. 
 130. See discussion infra Part III. 
 131. Calmar S.S. Corp. v. United States, 345 U.S. 446, 451 (1953). 
 132. See, e.g., Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 31101–31112 (2006); Suits in Admiralty Act, id. 
§§ 30901–30918. 
 133. Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S. 427, 432 (1952) (citation omitted). 
 134. Id. at 428–29; see also Amell v. United States, 384 U.S. 158, 160–61 (1966) (rejecting a 
worker’s compensation claim under both the SAA and the PVA when exclusive statutory remedy was 
available). 
 135. Federal Employees Compensation Act, ch. 458, 39 Stat. 742 (1916) (repealed and codified with 
provisions in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., ch. 81 (2006)). The current FECA, as amended in Pub. L. 
No. 89-488, 80 Stat. 252 (1966), is found at 5 U.S.C. § 8101 (2006). This version of the Act contains an 
exclusivity provision, establishing that its remedy “is exclusive and instead of all other liability . . . to 
the employee . . . [or] any other person otherwise entitled to recover damages from the United States or 
the instrumentality because of the injury or death . . . in admiralty, or . . . under a Federal tort liability 
statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (2006). 
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provided the exclusive remedy. Had Congress intended to provide 
federal employees relief under the PVA in addition to or exclusive of 
other benefits available to them under FECA, the Court continued, 
surely it would have said so.136 
Similarly, the PVA and SAA are “manifestations of a single larger 
purpose, jointly forming a rational system free of random omissions 
and exceptions.”137 Although this characterization may overstate the 
efficacy of the dual-statute system, it rightly rejects a belt-and-
suspenders interpretation of the PVA and SAA waivers: one works to 
the exclusion of the other, and the beginning of one statute’s 
jurisdictional territory marks the end of the other.138 As deletion of 
the Merchant Vessel Proviso from the SAA in 1960 arguably made 
clear, any admiralty claim against the government involving public 
vessels that is beyond the scope of the PVA is subject to the 
exclusive terms of the SAA.139 Should jurisdiction of all contract or 
tort claims in admiralty merely involving public vessels be subject to 
the terms of the PVA, a relatively small class of claims remains for 
the much broader waiver contained in the SAA.140 In determining 
whether the specific statute should swallow its more general 
counterpart, Congress’s chosen words provide an important point of 
comparison. 
																																																																																																																																
 136. Johansen, 343 U.S. at 428–29. But see id. at 432 (Black, J., dissenting) (insisting Congress 
intended to allow plaintiffs to take their pick between available methods for compensation, while 
attacking the majority’s reasoning as unreasonably formalistic and contrary to established precedent). 
See also Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (holding that the government is not liable 
under the FTCA “for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity 
incident to service”). Courts typically extend the Feres Doctrine to claims alleged under the PVA. See, 
e.g., Charland v. United States, 615 F.2d 508, 509 (9th Cir. 1980) (dismissing wrongful death claim for 
Navy seaman killed during training). 
 137. Calmar S.S. Corp. v. United States, 345 U.S. 446, 451 (1953). 
 138. See Blanco v. United States, 775 F.2d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (recognizing overlap between the 
PVA and the SAA, while stating that “actions involving public vessels are not cognizable under the 
[SAA] but must be brought solely under the PVA”). 
 139. See United States v. United Cont’l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 180–81 (1976). 
 140. This is particularly so given that wage claims by Federal employees working aboard government 
vessels are governed by the Tucker Act. See, e.g., Amell v. United States, 384 U.S. 158 (1966); see also 
supra note 135 (discussing FECA as exclusive remedy for federal employee claims resulting from 
personal injuries, even in admiralty). 
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B. Statutory Interpretation And The PVA 
In contrast to the PVA, the SAA provides a broad waiver of 
sovereign immunity, permitting civil actions in personam in 
admiralty against the government in cases where an action would lie 
if the vessel were privately owned or operated.141 This grant purports 
on its face to open the entire universe of admiralty claims against the 
government in a manner coextensive with rights enforceable against 
private defendants.142 At the same time, the PVA operates to remove 
certain enumerated claims from the SAA, permitting civil actions in 
personam in admiralty under only two circumstances: for “damages 
caused by a public vessel of the United States,” or for “compensation 
for towage and salvage services, including contract salvage, rendered 
to a public vessel of the United States.”143 Traditional canons of 
statutory interpretation are useful tools in construing these statutes, so 
long as they are deployed with appropriate restraint.144 Three 
commonly used canons prove helpful here.145 Particularly, the 
preference for strictly construing waivers of sovereign immunity, the 
																																																																																																																																
 141. 46 U.S.C. § 30903(a) (2006). 
 142. United Cont’l Tuna, 425 U.S. at 180–81, 184 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The plain language of 
the [SAA] authorizes anyone to sue the United States for damages caused by any United States 
vessel.”). Thus, assuming for a moment Congress never enacted the PVA, claims such as those in 
Taghadomi and Tobar would unquestionably fall within the grasp of the SAA. 
 143. § 31102(a). 
 144. See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction 
and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 652–55 (1992); Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims 
Never Die: The “Plain-Meaning Rule” and Statutory Interpretation in the “Modern” Federal Courts, 
75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299 (1975); David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921 (1992). Although useful, the canons are most dangerous when used to justify a 
pre-determined result or to maintain the status quo. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 431–32 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (George Stade ed., 2006) (“The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should 
be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the 
substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body.”); Shapiro, supra, at 921–26. 
 145. This is not to say there are not others. The disfavored maxim that statutes in derogation of the 
common law should be strictly construed invites a narrow reading of both the PVA and the SAA 
because they waive sovereign immunity—a concept deeply rooted in common law traditions. Shapiro, 
supra note 144, at 936–40; supra note 22 and accompanying text. Also, the presumption against implied 
repeal supports the continued distinction between the PVA and the SAA following removal of the 
Merchant Vessel Proviso. Without a presumption against implied repeal—and in the absence of an 
actual repeal—the PVA would founder in the rising tide of an SAA no longer limited by the Merchant 
Vessel Proviso. See United Cont’l Tuna, 425 U.S. at 168–69 (“[R]epeals by implication are not favored. 
The principle carries special weight when we are urged to find that a specific statute has been repealed 
by a more general one.” (citations omitted)). 
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maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of one 
excludes all others), and the plain meaning doctrine all suggest 
Congress intended a limited scope for the PVA. 
First, prior Supreme Court jurisprudence establishes that waivers 
of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed.146 Courts should 
apply the traditional principles favoring a strict construction,147 and 
must not enlarge any waiver “beyond what the language requires.”148 
Though in some cases—such as interpretation of the broad waiver of 
general tort liability contained in the FTCA—this principle may be 
abandoned, it should only be ignored when an unnecessarily strict 
interpretation frustrates the central purpose of a statute or regulatory 
scheme that is presented in “sweeping language.”149 The precise and 
limited language of the PVA is a far cry from the broad FTCA 
waiver (waiving immunity for “any claim against the government” 
sounding in tort).150 When viewed alongside the SAA’s broad 
waiver, the PVA’s specific language fails to qualify for the exception 
to the rule of strict construction.151 Accordingly, the waiver should be 
strictly construed and must not be enlarged beyond what its language 
permits. 
Second, the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius is helpful in 
considering subpart (2) of 46 U.S.C. § 31102(a), the PVA waiver of 
sovereign immunity for towage and salvage claims.152 Though 
perhaps the most criticized of the ancient maxims,153 inclusio unius 
																																																																																																																																
 146. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996); Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 673 (1996) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Nagle, supra note 30, at 836 (“And while it is not difficult to 
determine whether a statutory provision waives sovereign immunity generally, the scope of a statutory 
waiver as applied to particular claims presents a much harder question. The answer lies in the Court’s 
general approach to determining Congress’s intent, aided by a presumption against a waiver . . . .”). But 
see Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2011) (broad interpretation); Thomason v. United 
States, 184 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1950) (same). 
 147. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590 (1941). Interestingly, a strict construction of the 
PVA leads to broader remedies under the SAA. See discussion infra Part II.E. 
 148. E. Transp. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 675, 686 (1927). 
 149. See Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 491–92 (2006). 
 150. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680 (2006). 
 151. See Jefferson v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 209, 213 (D. Md. 1947) (“The wording of the Tort 
Claims Act is more analogous to the [SAA] than to the [PVA].”). 
 152. 46 U.S.C. § 31102(a). 
 153. See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 235 (1975) 
(explaining the maxim as “at best a description, after the fact, of what the court has discovered from 
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est exclusio alterius suggests that the inclusion of certain, enumerated 
items or rights operates to the exclusion of other items or rights that 
might be fairly considered in the same context.154 In deciding that 
maritime lien claims fall outside the PVA in Marine Coatings, the 
Eleventh Circuit correctly applied this maxim.155 Recognizing that 
the PVA waives sovereign immunity not only for damages caused by 
public vessels, but also for towage and salvage claims, the court 
noted it would have been meaningless for Congress to enumerate 
such claims if the Damages Provision incorporated all other maritime 
contract claims.156 
On the other hand, in a 1950 decision regarding civil service 
seamen seeking to recover unpaid wages, the Ninth Circuit ignored 
inclusio unius est exclusio alterius and held that wage claims do fall 
within the Damages Provision and thus the PVA and the SAA 
apply.157 Interestingly, nowhere in the three-page decision is the 
enumeration of contract claims even mentioned.158 Instead, the court 
cited Supreme Court precedent extending the PVA to noncollision 
property damage cases159 and personal injury cases160 in support of 
its proposition that the PVA should also cover wage suits.161 This 
																																																																																																																																
context”); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 282 (1985) (criticizing the 
canon as opportunistic and wrongly based in assumption that the legislature deliberately excluded all 
omissions not explicitly enumerated in a statute). 
 154. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 38, at 661, 831. The maxim is most helpful when 
considering the negative implications of positive language when no generalizing terms also appear. Id. 
at 661–62 (citing DICKERSON, supra note 153, at 234–35). Another maxim, ejusdem generis (of the 
same kind or class), provides that a generalizing word or phrase following a list suggests the statute 
should be interpreted to include items or rights similar to those listed, even if not explicitly provided for. 
Id. at 594. There are no generalizing terms in the PVA waiver. See § 31102. 
 155. Marine Coatings of Ala. v. United States, 71 F.3d 1558 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 156. Id. at 1564 (“The specific inclusion of particular contract claims would be meaningless if the 
‘damages’ provision extended to maritime contract claims in general.”). 
 157. Thomason v. United States, 184 F.2d 105, 107 (1950) (emphasis added). Technically, it is 
incorrect to say that both acts apply. The PVA and the SAA contain their own distinct waivers of 
sovereign immunity. If triggered, the PVA incorporates SAA provisions that are not inconsistent with its 
own terms. Marine Coatings, 71 F.3d at 1561 n.3 (“lifting of the Government’s sovereign 
immunity . . . is governed exclusively by the provisions in the [PVA]; the [SAA], in and of itself, simply 
does not apply.”); see discussion supra notes 87, 123. 
 158. See Thomason, 184 F.2d at 106–08. 
 159. Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215 (1945). 
 160. Am. Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947). 
 161. Thomason, 184 F.2d at 107. The court also cited a similar case, Jentry v. United States, 73 F. 
Supp. 899 (S.D. Cal. 1947), in support of its holding. Id. 
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interpretation not only makes presumptive use of loosely related 
precedent, but it also ignores the specific enumeration of only certain 
contract claims and results in an unnatural construction that the 
PVA’s plain language simply cannot bear.162 
Third, the plain meaning of the PVA does not support a broad 
interpretation. Unsurprisingly, the plain meaning doctrine suggests 
the words of a statute should be interpreted according to their plain 
meaning and assumes that a rational legislature communicates by 
using words in their ordinary and commonly accepted sense.163 
Rejected by some as a tautology that ignores the necessary context of 
any communication, the plain meaning rule recently has gained 
favor—especially among the justices of the Supreme Court.164 When 
the words of a statute are clear, the inquiry ends165 unless the plain 
meaning would require an unintended or absurd result, in which case 
a court may seek an alternative interpretation.166 
The plain meaning of the Damages Provision seems to require: (1) 
damages; (2) caused by; (3) a public vessel.167 Relying on the 
traditional personification of the ship as a juristic person, the Ninth 
Circuit in Thomason v. United States concluded that damages 
stemming from unpaid wages were caused by the vessel itself and 
thus triggered the PVA.168 This is so, the court reasoned, because a 
public vessel is a juristic person and, as such, is responsible for the 
actions of its crewmembers related to the vessel’s possession or 
																																																																																																																																
 162. See Marine Coatings, 71 F.3d at 1564. 
 163. Shapiro, supra note 144, at 931–34; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 38, at 1267. 
 164. See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) (“There is, of course, no 
more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook 
to give expression to its wishes.”); Shapiro, supra note 144, at 931–34. 
 165. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice 
Scalia suggests this approach: 
[F]irst, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual context; and second, using 
established canons of construction, ask whether there is any clear indication that some 
permissible meaning other than the ordinary one applies. If not—and especially if a good 
reason for the ordinary meaning appears plain—we apply that ordinary meaning. 
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 166. Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 470–71 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 167. 46 U.S.C. § 31102(a)(1) (2006). 
 168. See Thomason v. United States, 184 F.2d 105, 107–08 (1950). 
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operation.169 However, Justice Reed suggested in Canadian Aviator 
v. United States that the personification doctrine cuts both ways: 
The use of the [phrase] ‘caused by a public vessel’ constitutes an 
adoption by Congress of the customary legal terminology of the 
admiralty law which refers to the vessel as causing the harm 
although the actual cause is the negligence of the personnel in 
the operation of the ship. Such [personification] of the vessel, 
treating it as a juristic person whose acts and omissions, although 
brought about by her personnel, are personal acts of the ship for 
which, as a juristic person, she is legally responsible, has long 
been recognized by this Court.170 
With this in mind, is it enough for a vessel simply to be involved? 
Or must the vessel, as a result of the acts or omissions of its 
personnel, be the actual cause of the claimed damages? In Thomason, 
the Ninth Circuit suggested that the personification of a vessel makes 
her a sort of unknowing co-conspirator, and that all claims merely 
involving her trigger the PVA.171 Even when the vessel is at best an 
indirect cause of the injury or merely facilitates the injury, she must 
answer; and because she must answer, the PVA applies.172 But, it is 
one thing to say that a ship is responsible for the actions of her crew 
in directing her movements. It is quite another—and contrary to the 
plain meaning of the PVA—to say that because of this imputed 
																																																																																																																																
 169. See id. 
 170. Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 224 (1945) (emphasis added); see also 
George K. Walker, The Personification of the Vessel in United States Civil In Rem Actions and the 
International Law Context, 15 TUL. MAR. L.J. 177 (1991). The personification doctrine traces its roots 
to forfeiture law and is most commonly used as a justification for in rem proceedings against a ship. Id. 
at 189. Thus, despite its romantic and curious nature the doctrine should be employed cautiously as a 
justification for expanding the PVA. See id. 
 171. See Thomason, 184 F.2d at 107–08; see also Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 1199 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (“Although the public vessel itself played a direct role only in some of the actions . . . the 
public vessel’s role in all of the actions of the crew is unmistakable.”). 
 172. See Thomason, 184 F.2d at 107–08. The Tobar court refers to its holding in Thomason: “We 
held, for instance, that ‘unpaid compensation for seamen’s services’ were ‘damages caused by a public 
vessel.’” Tobar, 639 F.3d at 1198 (quoting Thomason, 184 F.2d at 108). 
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responsibility a ship thus causes any and all damages even remotely 
relating to her existence.173 
The Eleventh Circuit correctly interprets the PVA in a more 
ordinary and limited sense, where personification of the vessel 
suggests the vessel must be the cause of claimed damages.174 Taking 
the language of the Damages Provision at face value and as 
ordinarily understood, the Eleventh Circuit recognized a close causal 
nexus between the public vessel and the resulting damages, however 
the term damages may be defined.175 Though animated by her 
crewmembers, a vessel is a juristic person capable of inflicting 
damages of her own.176 In this sense, it is simple to distinguish 
injuries merely involving a ship and those resulting from a ship’s 
“actions.”177 But, with or without the personification analysis, the 
statute’s language is clear on its face: the public vessel itself must 
cause the claimed damages and, at first glance, not merely act as a 
proxy for the independent actions of its crew unrelated to navigation 
or operation of the vessel.178 As Marine Coatings and Uralde 
suggest, construing the statute strictly does not lead to patently 
																																																																																																																																
 173. Marine Coatings of Ala. v. United States, 71 F.3d 1558, 1563–64 (11th Cir. 1996). But see Ira S. 
Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 1968) (“It is no strain whatever on the 
language to say that a public vessel has ‘caused’ any tort damage for which she is legally responsible.” 
(citing Thomason, 184 F.2d 105)). 
 174. Marine Coatings, 71 F.3d at 1564. 
 175. See id. at 1563 (stating that damages there resulted from the government’s failure to pay for 
repair work, not from any negligent act by a ship or its crew). “Damages” typically means “[m]oney 
claimed by, or ordered to be paid to, a person as compensation for loss or injury.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 38, at 445. “Damage” typically means “[l]oss or injury to person or property.” 
Id. The Supreme Court noted this distinction, suggesting “damages” (plural) refers to that which a 
plaintiff is awarded as a result of a successful claim, while “damage” (singular) refers to the injury 
suffered on account of another party’s unlawful act. See Am. Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 
450 n.6 (1947). Use of the plural “damages” in the PVA supports extension of the act to personal injury 
claims, but its effect on clarifying the required causal nexus between vessel and damages is unclear. See 
id. Surely a vessel can be the cause of damages resulting from injury to property or person, or even the 
remedy in a breach of contract action (based on traditional in rem principles); but can she ever be said to 
be the cause of damages resulting from a breach of contract? See supra text accompanying notes 171–
73. 
 176. See generally The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125, 133–38 (1873) (discussing in rem 
liability of vessel); The China, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 53 (1868) (same). 
 177. Cf. Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215 (1945) (public vessel acting as tow led 
another vessel into a submerged wreck); Uralde v. United States, 614 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(crewmembers arrive on public vessel and board private vessel during rescue). 
 178. See Marine Coatings, 71 F.3d at 1564. 
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absurd results that are clearly outside Congress’s intentions.179 Thus, 
the plain meaning of the statute must inform interpretation of the 
PVA.180 Despite a modest expansion of the PVA in the cases 
discussed below, the Supreme Court has reasonably adhered to the 
statute’s plain meaning. 
C. The Supreme Court: A “Broad” Interpretation? 
In addition to providing general rules for interpreting statutory 
waivers of sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court has on several 
occasions addressed the PVA’s contours.181 The Ninth Circuit 
generally relies on three cases—Canadian Aviator v. United 
States,182 American Stevedores v. Porello,183 and United States v. 
United Continental Tuna Corporation184—in support of its broad 
interpretation of the PVA.185 In doing so, the court goes too far.186 
While these cases broadened the scope of the PVA beyond collision 
cases involving damage to property, they do not support the generally 
broad interpretation articulated by the Ninth Circuit.187 Instead, two 
of these cases—decided before the 1960 amendments to the SAA—
exhibit decided caution in applying the PVA waiver under reasonable 
and limited circumstances.188 And, importantly, they did so at a time 
before any claim not cognizable under the PVA would nonetheless be 
covered by the SAA.189 Taken together, these cases complement the 
																																																																																																																																
 179. See Uralde, 614 F.3d at 1284; Marine Coatings, 71 F.3d at 1564. 
 180. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 181. See generally United States v. United Cont’l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164 (1976); Am. Stevedores, 
Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947); Canadian Aviator, 324 U.S. 215. 
 182. Canadian Aviator, 324 U.S. 215. 
 183. Am. Stevedores, 330 U.S. 446. 
 184. United Cont’l Tuna, 425 U.S. 164. 
 185. See, e.g., Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 1199–1200 (9th Cir. 2011); Thomason v. 
United States, 184 F.2d 105, 107–08 (9th Cir. 1950). 
 186. Marine Coatings, 71 F.3d at 1563–64 (criticizing the Ninth Circuit view as overly broad). 
 187. See Marine Coatings, 71 F.3d at 1564 (“Canadian Aviator and American Stevedores, while not 
collision cases of the type described in the legislative history, are nonetheless cases involving torts 
committed by . . . public vessels that caused damage to person or property. It would be a stretch to hold 
that these cases support the extension of the [PVA] to cover all maritime claims . . . in contract or in 
tort.”); see also discussion infra Part II.C.1–3. 
 188. See discussion infra Part II.C.1–3; see also supra note 187. 
 189. Marine Coatings, 71 F.3d at 1564 n.8 (“Canadian Aviator, American Stevedores, and Thomason 
were decided at a time when an expansive reading of the ‘damages’ provision served to enlarge the 
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conclusion drawn from the preceding plain meaning analysis: a strict 
but reasonable interpretation of the PVA is most appropriate. 
1. Canadian Aviator v. United States (1945) 
In Canadian Aviator, a ship known as the Cavelier entered 
Delaware Bay, where Naval authorities ordered the boat to follow 
directly astern a Navy patrol boat.190 While following as directed, the 
Cavelier allided with a submerged wreck.191 The district court 
dismissed the action because the Navy vessel was not the “efficient 
cause” of the accident;192 instead, the “personal and independent 
negligence” of the crew caused the Cavelier to strike the wreck.193 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the PVA “extends to cases 
where the negligence of the personnel of a public vessel in the 
operation of the vessel causes damage to other ships, their cargoes, 
and personnel, regardless of physical contact between the two 
ships.”194 
After announcing its rule, the Court stated it found no reason to 
allow recovery in collision cases, while refusing recovery “for 
damages caused by other movements of the offending vessel.”195 The 
Court also stated that the “broad statutory language authorizing suit” 
should not be “thwarted by an unduly restrictive interpretation.”196 
																																																																																																																																
coverage of the [PVA].”). 
 190. Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 216–17 (1945). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 217–18. The Navy vessel was not the “noxious instrument” causing the harm. Id. at 218. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 224–25 (emphasis added). 
 195. Id. at 225 (emphasis added). 
 196. Canadian Aviator, 324 U.S. at 222 (“[A] narrow interpretation of the Act is not justifiable. While 
the general history of the Act as outlined above does not establish that the statute necessarily extends to 
the noncollision cases in view of the rule of strict construction of statutory waiver of sovereign 
immunity, we think Congressional adoption of broad statutory language authorizing suit was 
deliberate . . . .” (citation omitted)). This language can be misleading out of context. An original version 
of the PVA contained a waiver for damages resulting only from collisions with public vessels; however, 
Congress removed this requirement from the final bill. See discussion infra Part II.B. Thus, a PVA 
without the word “collision” is properly characterized as broader than one with the word. But, given the 
sweeping language of the SAA in its present state, it is difficult to consider the PVA as a similarly broad 
waiver. See Marine Coatings of Ala. v. United States, 71 F.3d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e do 
not read the Supreme Court’s decisions as an effort to stretch the meaning of the ‘damages’ provision as 
far as it will go, but rather as an effort not to limit the phrase in an unnatural manner, in light of the 
congressional purpose [of the PVA].”). Compare 46 U.S.C. § 31102(a) (2006) (limited waiver), with 
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The Ninth Circuit seized on this language in several cases to support 
an even broader interpretation.197 But, Canadian Aviator stands only 
for the unremarkable proposition that a collision is not necessary to 
trigger the PVA: negligence on behalf of the crew in the operation 
and movement of a public vessel that directly causes damage to 
another vessel, its cargo, or personnel is sufficient.198 Canadian 
Aviator expanded the scope of the PVA beyond collision cases, but 
the requirement of a close causal nexus between the operation or 
movement of the ship and resulting damage clearly survived.199 
The Supreme Court’s characterization of the PVA’s waiver as 
broad is interesting for two reasons. First, the Court highlighted the 
importance of a House Resolution200 introduced before the PVA 
became law.201 This bill would have authorized suit against the 
government for “damages caused by collision by a public vessel.”202 
The Court correctly reasoned that removal of “by collision” from the 
final bill indicated Congress’s intention to also allow suit in 
noncollision cases.203 Second, in 1945 it was easier to characterize 
the PVA’s waiver as broad—or at least to justify doing so—in light 
of the restrictive nature of the pre-1960 SAA.204 Because the SAA at 
the time only allowed claims involving public vessels employed as 
merchant vessels, a strict reading of the PVA would leave deserving 
plaintiffs injured by non-merchant public vessels without relief.205 A 
generally broad scope is unnecessary today because the amended 
SAA “affords an open berth in the district courts, provided the claims 
are of a maritime nature.”206 
																																																																																																																																
§ 30903(a) (broad waiver). 
 197. See Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 1198–99 (9th Cir. 2011) (“For decades, we—and the 
Supreme Court—have interpreted [the PVA] broadly.”); Taghadomi v. United States, 401 F.3d 1080, 
1088 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Canadian Aviator in support of allowing a negligent search claim under the 
PVA). 
 198. Canadian Aviator, 324 U.S. at 224–25. 
 199. Id. 
 200. H.R. 6989, 68th Cong. (1924). 
 201. Canadian Aviator, 324 U.S. at 223. 
 202. Id. (emphasis added) (citing H.R. 6989). 
 203. Canadian Aviator, 324 U.S. at 223; see discussion supra Part II.D. 
 204. See supra note 189. 
 205. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
 206. Amell v. United States, 384 U.S. 158, 160 (1966); see also Marine Coatings of Ala. v. United 
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2. American Stevedores v. Porello (1947) 
American Stevedores extended the PVA to damages for personal 
injury.207 In American Stevedores, a beam resting across a hatch fell 
into the hold and struck a longshoreman working aboard the ship.208 
The Court held that, because damages traditionally are awarded for 
injury to both property and person, the longshoreman should be 
permitted to maintain suit against the government.209 The majority 
thought that Congress could have limited the scope of the bill to only 
property damages simply by saying so.210 Further, at least according 
to the Court, the legislative record suggested Congress intended the 
scope of the PVA to be similar to that of its sister statute, the SAA, 
but applied to public vessels.211 The dissent disagreed; Justice 
Frankfurter wrote that Congress never expressly stated the bill 
extended to personal injury suits.212 He also insisted the waiver must 
be construed as a whole, reading “damages caused by a public 
vessel” together and spontaneously, rather than considering 
“damages” in isolation.213 This reading suggests the injury must be 
“inflicted by a public vessel rather than . . . incurred in connection 
with its operation.”214 Revisiting Canadian Aviator just two years 
later, Justice Frankfurter suggested its holding only established that 
personnel are considered part of the public vessel for purposes of 
causing damage to other vessels.215 Perhaps the dissent goes too far 
as well,216 but inclusion of personal injury damages within the PVA 
																																																																																																																																
States, 71 F.3d 1558, 1564 n.8 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Since 1960 . . . any claim not covered by the [PVA] is 
covered by the [SAA].”). 
 207. Am. Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 453–54 (1947). 
 208. Id. at 449. 
 209. Id. at 450. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 452–53. But this conclusion treads thin ice, given the general tenor of the legislative 
record. See discussion infra Part II.D. 
 212. Am. Stevedores, 330 U.S. at 460–63. 
 213. Id. at 460–61. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. For example, is there any good reason to allow claims for property damage and not damage to a 
person when both result from the same collision with a public vessel? Either way, there is some support 
in the legislative history for the dissent’s view. See 66 CONG. REC. 2087–88 (1925). In a hearing, 
Representative MacLafferty asked the bill’s proponent, Representative Underhill: Is it “provided that the 
suits can only be taken into the admiralty court where the blame has been laid on the Government[?]” 
29
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supports a generally broad interpretation of its terms no more than 
does the incorporation of noncollision cases in Canadian Aviator.217 
3. United States v. United Continental Tuna Corporation (1976) 
In United Continental Tuna the Supreme Court reversed a Ninth 
Circuit determination that, following the 1960 amendments to the 
SAA, suits involving collisions with public vessels were also 
cognizable under the SAA.218 The plaintiff in the original action, a 
Philippine corporation, alleged a naval destroyer collided with one of 
its fishing vessels and caused it to sink.219 To avoid the PVA’s 
reciprocity requirement, the plaintiffs alleged jurisdiction under the 
SAA.220 Acknowledging the claim as falling indisputably within the 
scope of the PVA, the Court considered exactly what Congress 
wrought by removing the Merchant Vessel Proviso from the SAA.221 
Highlighting the history and legislative records of the two acts,222 the 
Court found Congress had no intention to “render nugatory” the 
provisions of the PVA.223 Nor was Congress concerned with 
determining which claims fell within one act or the other; instead, the 
SAA covered “whatever category of claims involving public vessels 
was beyond the scope of the [PVA].”224 Importantly, the Court 
																																																																																																																																
Id. at 2088. Mr. Underhill responded: “Not entirely; where a man’s property is damaged, he can bring a 
suit.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 217. The Ninth Circuit quotes American Stevedores in Tobar as “recognizing ‘the growing feeling of 
Congress that the United States should put aside its sovereign armor in cases where federal employees 
have tortiously caused personal injury or property damage.’” Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 
1198 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Am. Stevedores, 330 U.S. at 453). In doing so, the Ninth Circuit presents 
the language incompletely and out of context. In American Stevedores, the Court suggested the SAA, 
the PVA, and the FTCA, taken together, support a general premise that suits against the government 
should be permitted in more cases than traditionally thought. See Am. Stevedores, 330 U.S. at 453. It 
does not follow that the PVA, on its own and as applied in American Stevedores, should be read broadly 
and in a way that conflicts with its plain meaning. 
 218. United States v. United Cont’l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 167 (1976). The Ninth Circuit reached 
this determination despite recognizing its holding permitted plaintiffs to circumvent the restrictive 
reciprocity provision contained in the PVA in a manner likely not intended by Congress. United Cont’l 
Tuna Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 1974), rev’d, 425 U.S. 164 (1976). 
 219. United Cont’l Tuna, 425 U.S. at 166. 
 220. Id. at 165. 
 221. Id. at 170–78. 
 222. Id.; see discussion infra Part II.D. 
 223. United Cont’l Tuna, 425 U.S. at 178. 
 224. Id. at 178, 180–81. 
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recognized that collision claims did not factor into Congress’s 
decision to amend the SAA in 1960.225 Claims once subject to the 
PVA remained subject to its terms following the amendments.226 But, 
other claims outside the scope of the PVA and SAA—previously 
cognizable on the law side of the courts—now fell under the SAA.227 
Despite some confusion,228 the result in this case is fairly 
straightforward: claims originally subject to the terms of the PVA 
remain subject to the PVA after the 1960 amendments to the SAA, 
and certain maritime claims previously excluded from both the PVA 
and SAA are now cognizable under the SAA.229 In the end, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United Continental Tuna did nothing to 
alter the scope of claims originally cognizable under the PVA.230 
After all, the Court merely held that a collision case involving a 
public vessel must be brought under the PVA and not the SAA.231 
Luckily, the legislative record provides a useful glimpse into what 
the PVA’s progenitors thought about its original scope. 
																																																																																																																																
 225. Id. at 181 (“[C]laims like the instant one, that fell within the [PVA], presented none of the 
problems with which Congress was concerned in 1960, and there is therefore no reason to infer that 
Congress intended to affect them.”). 
 226. Id. 
 227. See id. at 172–81 (“Maritime tort claims deemed beyond the reach of both Acts could be brought 
only on the law side of the district courts . . . . More importantly for our purposes, contract claims not 
encompassed by either Act fell within the Tucker Act, which lodged exclusive jurisdiction in the Court 
of Claims for claims exceeding $10,000. . . . Congress’[s] deletion of the [Merchant Vessel Proviso] was 
clearly intended to remove such uncertainty as to the proper forum by bringing within the [SAA] 
whatever category of claims involving public vessels was beyond the scope of the [PVA].” (citations 
omitted)). 
 228. See id. at 183–84 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that the SAA’s plain meaning should permit 
any suit involving public vessels, while failing to consider the maxim lex specialis derogat generali 
(specific overrides general)); Taghadomi v. United States, 401 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing 
United Continental Tuna for the proposition that the PVA should not be interpreted along textualist lines 
and that the plain meaning of the PVA and the SAA would have permitted the plaintiffs to avoid the 
reciprocity requirement). On the contrary, the plain meaning of the PVA did subject the plaintiffs in 
United Continental Tuna (who were suing for collision damages) to reciprocity. See United Cont’l Tuna, 
425 U.S. at 178–81. The plain meaning of the SAA, in a world without the PVA, would permit suit 
against public vessels without regard to reciprocity. But for those claims that trigger the PVA, its more 
restrictive provisions apply. Id. 
 229. United Cont’l Tuna, 425 U.S. at 180–81. 
 230. Id. at 181 (“Claims within the scope of the [PVA] remain subject to its terms after the 1960 
amendment to the [SAA]. . . . [T]here is no dispute that respondent’s claim falls within the embrace of 
the [PVA] . . . .”). 
 231. Id. 
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D. The Legislative Record: Collisions And The Like, Or Something 
More? 
The legislative history of the PVA suggests its proponents 
intended a strict interpretation of its terms. Like other tools of 
statutory interpretation, legislative histories must be used with 
care.232 Generally, when a statute is clear on its face, a court need not 
delve into the legislative record.233 But, when a statute is ambiguous, 
a court may consult the legislative record to help illuminate its 
construction.234 Here, the plain meaning of the PVA’s waiver is clear. 
Ultimately, it is thus unnecessary to resort to the legislative record. 
But, given the confusion among the circuits, it is nevertheless 
appropriate—arguendo—to consider the legislative history.235 
Several proposed laws preceded the bill that would eventually 
become the PVA,236 House Bill 9535.237 However, only those bills 
pending during the 68th Congress—when the PVA became law—are 
appropriate to consider.238 The first bill proposed waiving sovereign 
immunity “for damages caused by collision by a public vessel.”239 
																																																																																																																																
 232. See generally Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality 
Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627 
(2002); Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story 
of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833 (1998). 
 233. Heppner v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 665 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1981). However, there is no 
per se rule forbidding use of the record when the legislature’s intent is clearly expressed in the statute. 
Train v. Colo. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 426 U.S. 1, 9 (1976). 
 234. Heppner, 665 F.2d at 871. One exception establishes that a court must not ignore clear and 
credible statutory language that demands a result contrary to that which the court seeks to reach on plain 
language alone. See Train, 426 U.S. at 9–10. 
 235. Because the 1960 amendments to the SAA did not affect the scope of the PVA, but instead 
merely brought new claims under the SAA, the legislative history related to that statutory change does 
little to shed light on the proper scope of the PVA. See discussion supra Part II.C. It suffices to note that 
the legislative histories related to passage of the PVA pre-date the 1960 amendments to the SAA, and 
any public vessel carve-out created by the PVA resulted in an exclusive waiver of sovereign immunity 
for damages caused by a public vessel. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 236. See Am. Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 450 n.7 (1947) (citing H.R. 9075, 68th Cong. 
(1924); H.R. 6989, 68th Cong. (1924); H.R. 15977, 66th Cong. (1921); H.R. 6256, 67th Cong. (1921)). 
 237. See id. at 451 (citing H.R. 9535, 68th Cong. (1924)). 
 238. Id. at 450. The earlier reports are still helpful even though they replicate much of the information 
contained in the reports attached to the final bill. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 66-1301 (1921). Interestingly, 
one congressional report lists fifteen special acts passed between 1900 and 1917. Id. at 4. Each entry 
provides the name of the vessel and the date the “[a]ccident occurred.” Id. Two acts, filed near the end 
of the Civil War, passed after 1900. Id. The others, on average, became law two to three years after the 
initial petition for relief. See id. 
 239. Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 223 (1945) (emphasis added) (citing H.R. 
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The second would have amended the SAA to remove the Merchant 
Vessel Proviso and include damages caused by public vessels under 
its terms.240 Proponents of the ultimately successful bill introduced it 
as “a substitute for H.R. 6989” (the bill requiring collision) and 
identified its chief purpose as “grant[ing] private owners of vessels 
and of merchandise a right of action when their vessels or goods have 
been damaged as the result of a collision with any Government-
owned vessel.”241 
Unfortunately, Congress did not explain why it removed the 
collision provision.242 To add to the complication, one statement 
suggests the bill could be construed to cover a wide variety of 
claims.243 But, given the consistent focus throughout the record on 
the exclusive application of the bill’s waiver to collision cases, it is 
difficult to conclude Congress intended a generally broad waiver.244 
In fact, the House Report accompanying the PVA includes responses 
from high-level government officials detailing the public vessels 
involved in collisions during the preceding four years.245 The House 
and Senate reports (“Reports”) each span twenty-three nearly 
identical pages; the final seven pages log the frequency and cost of 
collisions involving public vessels since January 1, 1920.246 By no 
means dispositive—but certainly suggestive of general focus—the 
word “collision” is used at least fifty-three times in the Reports.247 
																																																																																																																																
6989, 68th Cong. (1924)). 
 240. Am. Stevedores, 330 U.S. at 450–51 (citing H.R. 9075, 68th Cong. (1924)). Unfortunately, this 
bill never reached the floor of Congress. Id. Although the 68th Congress conducted its business without 
the luxury of hindsight, successful enactment of this bill might have prevented the jurisdictional 
confusion that has persisted for nearly a century. See Nosek, supra note 6, at 45–48. 
 241. S. REP. NO. 68-941, at 1 (1925); H.R. REP. NO. 68-913, at 1 (1924). The House Report and 
Senate Report are, with a few minor and immaterial exceptions, identical. Because the bill originated in 
the House, subsequent citations will include only the House Report. 
 242. Am. Stevedores, 330 U.S. at 461–62 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting government brief). 
 243. See, e.g., 66 CONG. REC. 2087 (1925) (statement of Rep. Charles Lee Underhill) (“The bill I 
have introduced simply allows suits in admiralty to be brought by owners of vessels whose property has 
been damaged by collision or other fault of Government vessels and Government agents.”). 
 244. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 68-913; 66 CONG. REC. 3560 (1925); 66 CONG. REC. 2087. 
 245. The secretaries of Treasury, War, Commerce, and the Navy all fulfilled such requests. See H.R. 
REP. NO. 68-913, at 9–16. 
 246. See id. at 17–23. 
 247. See id. at 1–23. For another interesting discussion of the PVA, see generally Suspending the 
Provisions of the Public Vessels Act of 1925 Until Twelve Months after the Termination of the War: 
Hearing on S. 1173 Before the S. Comm. on Naval Affairs, 78th Cong. (1943). During the course of yet 
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Defining the PVA’s purpose, the Reports proposed discarding the 
“long established” private bill practice and replacing it with an 
efficient remedy for “[s]hipowners, whose vessels have suffered a 
collision with any Government-owned ship in the public service.”248 
Summarizing existing law, the Reports recognized availability of 
Tucker Act jurisdiction for contract claims, while noting the absence 
of any forum for shipowners injured by the “negligent navigation of a 
public vessel.”249 Also, the Reports made reference to “the Act of 
December 28, 1922”250 as the “only general legislation covering the 
subject matter of the pending bill,” but found the limited remedy 
provided there “wholly inadequate, since the damages in collision 
cases are usually very large in amount.”251 In short, this Act allowed 
the Secretary of the Navy to award up to $3,000 for damages 
“occasioned by collisions or damage incident to the operation of 
vessels for which collisions or other damage vessels of the Navy or 
vessels in the Naval Service shall be found to be responsible.”252 
With such a limited class of claims comprising the “subject matter of 
the pending [PVA],” it blinds the truth to suggest that the PVA’s 
proponents intended a broad waiver of immunity in the Damages 
Provision.253 
Finally, the letter of Attorney General Harlan Stone that Congress 
attached to its Reports reveals some indication of the intended scope 
of the law.254 The Supreme Court in American Stevedores supported 
																																																																																																																																
another conversation heavily focused on collisions, MLAUS president John Griffin stated: “[MLAUS] 
was one of the active proponents of the [SAA] in 1920 and of the [PVA] in 1925. Up to that time—the 
time of those acts—the maxim that the king could do no wrong . . . had been applied to these cases of 
maritime collisions.” Id. at 29. An MLAUS memorandum in opposition to the bill is attached to the 
hearing record. Id. at 69–75. It contends the proposed bill suspending the PVA “would not forbid the 
United States to sue private owners for such collisions and, in this respect, it would be entirely ‘one 
way’ legislation.” Id. at 71. The proposed bill became law in 1944. See Act of July 3, 1944, Pub. L. No. 
78-417, 58 Stat. 723. 
 248. H.R. REP. NO. 68-913, at 1. 
 249. Id. at 2. 
 250. Act of Dec. 28, 1922, ch. 16, 42 Stat. 1066. The act is introduced as “An Act [t]o amend the Act 
authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to settle claims for damages to private property arising from 
collisions with naval vessels.” Id. 
 251. H.R. REP. NO. 68-913, at 5 (emphasis added). 
 252. 42 Stat. at 1066. 
 253. H.R. REP. NO. 68-913, at 5. 
 254. See generally id. at 11–13 (letter of Att’y Gen. Harlan Stone); see also Blanco v. United States, 
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its expansion of the PVA to personal injury cases by quoting Mr. 
Stone’s letter as follows: “The proposed bill intends to give the same 
relief against the Government for damages . . . caused by its public 
vessels . . . as is now given against the United States in the operation 
of its merchant vessels, as provided by the [SAA].”255 The Court did 
so disingenuously.256 Mr. Stone’s actual words indicated his 
understanding that the bill covered “damages caused by collision” 
with a public vessel—a distinction not without significance.257 
Though the letter was a response to H.R. 6989 (the bill including the 
“collision by” requirement), Congress attached Mr. Stone’s letter—in 
its original form—to the PVA as enacted by H.R. 9535.258 Perhaps 
Mr. Stone did, after removal of the word collision from the bill, 
change his mind about the necessity of collision as a precondition to 
jurisdiction. The record, however, reflects otherwise.259 Despite the 
Supreme Court’s conclusion, Mr. Stone’s analysis suggests he saw 
the PVA as a limited waiver for a small category of claims.260 
Congress’s incorporation of his analysis into the Reports attached to 
the PVA suggests it agreed with him.261 
																																																																																																																																
775 F.2d 53, 57 n.5 (2d Cir. 1985) (“The Supreme Court has given weight to this letter as an indication 
of the intended effect of the PVA.”). 
 255. Am. Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 452 (1947). 
 256. Compare Am. Stevedores, 330 U.S. at 452–53 (without the word collision), with H.R. REP. NO. 
68-913, at 11 (letter of Att’y Gen. Harlan Stone) (with the word collision). Mere removal of a word 
from a final bill, without more, does not justify judicial abscission of the word from a part of the 
legislative record Congress deemed important enough to include in its entirety. 
 257. H.R. REP. NO. 68-913, at 11–13 (letter of Att’y Gen. Harlan Stone). 
 258. Id. 
 259. See supra text accompanying notes 256–58. 
 260. See H.R. REP. NO. 68-913, at 11–13 (letter of Att’y Gen. Harlan Stone). During his examination, 
Mr. Stone also observed that “the present act grants relief for salvage and towage claims in addition to 
collision torts.” Id. at 12. Mr. Stone continued, summarizing the bill: 
The proposed legislation is a departure from the rule heretofore strictly adhered to that 
the Government will not be liable for the torts of its officers . . . . If the rule or principle is 
modified so as to grant relief for collision damages inflicted by public vessels, like 
legislation granting relief for the ordinary torts on land, such as damages caused by 
collision with Army trucks or Post Office mail wagons, may be urged. Suggestions which 
have come to my notice favoring the bill include the view that the practice of admiralty 
and international law and procedure place such torts separate and apart from the ordinary 
torts committed on land, as the vessel is defined the offender rather than the owner of the 
vessel. 
Id. at 11. 
 261. See also id. at 3 (suggesting that the maxim “sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your 
own as not to injure another’s property)” supported Congress’s continued recognition that the 
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E. Policy and Persuasive Authority: A Little Direction, Please? 
The policy arguments are counterintuitive: a strict interpretation of 
the PVA results in broader access to the courts and enlarged remedies 
under the SAA.262 In short, the PVA requires reciprocity and 
prohibits interest, while the SAA does neither.263 One conceivable 
advantage to bringing suit under the PVA lies in its more liberal 
venue provision.264 But this creates yet another problem. Because 
foreign plaintiffs may bring suit where the offending vessel is found 
under the SAA (compared to any district court under the PVA), a 
broad reading of the PVA incorporating contract claims and torts 
merely involving public vessels frustrates specific policy judgments 
of Congress as to venue allocation and invites forum shopping.265 A 
foreign plaintiff with a contract claim who lacks reciprocity might 
very well wait until the public vessel involved arrives in a strict-
construction jurisdiction. In the Eleventh Circuit, for example, this 
plaintiff would not have to prove reciprocity and, if successful, would 
be entitled to pre-judgment interest under the SAA.266 In the Ninth 
Circuit, however, the very same plaintiff would be required to prove 
reciprocity and, if successful in doing so, would also be denied 
interest under the PVA.267 
																																																																																																																																
government is obligated to remedy injuries occasioned by maritime collisions); 66 CONG. REC. 3560 
(1925) (statement of Sen. Thomas Francis Bayard, Jr.) (stating the PVA would replace the private bill 
practice and “give a person aggrieved because of an accident by reason of the shortcomings of a United 
States ship the right to go in to a district court and prosecute his action”); 66 CONG. REC. 2087 (1925) 
(statement of Rep. Fiorello Henry La Guardia) (“[Mr. Underhill], you provide for collisions at sea 
between vessels.”); id. at 2089 (statement of Rep. Thomas Lindsay Blanton) (“In every bill of this kind 
. . . it is usual to put in a provision that all matters of dispute with respect to that transaction, to wit, a 
collision at sea, shall be adjudicated by the court . . . .”); id. (insisting the PVA should explicitly permit 
the government to file a cross action and “have a judgment against the one who files the libel, if he has 
caused the collision”). 
 262. See, e.g., Marine Coatings of Ala. v. United States, 71 F.3d 1558, 1564 n.8 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(identifying that strict interpretation of damages provision in PVA results in enlarged remedy under 
SAA, which provides interest). 
 263. See discussion supra Part I.D. 
 264. United States v. United Cont’l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168 n.2 (1976). 
 265. Compare 46 U.S.C. § 30906(a) (2006) (limited venue), with § 31104 (expanded venue). 
 266. See Marine Coatings, 71 F.3d at 1564 n.8. 
 267. See Taghadomi v. United States, 401 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting noncitizen’s suit 
under PVA partly because of lacking reciprocity); Thomason v. United States, 184 F.2d 105, 107–08 
(9th Cir. 1950) (holding wage claim cognizable under PVA). 
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Another advantage to a broad reading of the PVA is that it results 
in wider application of the PVA prohibition against subpoenaing 
crewmembers without the permission of the commanding officer.268 
That crewmembers are subject to direct subpoena under the SAA 
causes more concern with interdiction claims like those in Tobar and 
Uralde, where crew testimony could prove useful.269 But with 
contract claims like those in Marine Coatings or Thomason, it is 
difficult to see why crewmember testimony would be helpful in the 
first place.270 Either way, courts should resist expanding the PVA 
beyond its intended bounds to provide substantive or procedural 
“protection” for claims covered by the SAA after removal of the 
Merchant Vessel Proviso.271 
Additionally, circuit decisions are confused; outside the “easy” 
collision cases,272 no clear organizing principles emerge from the 
cases.273 Some courts speak of both acts applying; others properly 
distinguish between the PVA and SAA.274 Several courts consider the 
mere involvement of a public vessel to be enough; others require a 
closer causal connection.275 Generic contract claims involving public 
																																																																																																																																
 268. See § 31110. 
 269. See discussion supra Part I.E. 
 270. See Marine Coatings, 71 F.3d at 1563 (recognizing no negligent act by ship or crew but instead 
only simple failure to pay a bill). 
 271. See United States v. United Cont’l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 179 (1976) (“Congress did nothing 
to alter the distinction between the [SAA and PVA], or expand the one at the expense of the other.”). 
 272. It is not just the collision cases that make for easy decisions. In perhaps the most interesting 
attempt to expand the PVA, an inmate filed a pro se complaint alleging a civil rights violation and a libel 
claim under the PVA for injuries sustained while being “roughed up” by prison guards. See Hernandez-
Chavez v. Corrections Corp. of Am., No. 07-3198-SAC, 2009 WL 1689304, at *1–3 (D. Kan. 2009). 
The court dismissed the inmate’s claims. Id. at *2–3. 
 273. See infra notes 274–78. 
 274. See, e.g., Adams v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 2d 647, 649 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (stating that claims 
involving public vessels other than claims “for damages caused by a public vessel” are covered by the 
SAA and finding suit for personal injuries sustained aboard public vessel cognizable under PVA); Parks 
v. United States, 784 F.2d 20, 28–29 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that a claim for injuries sustained on a 
public vessel fell under both the PVA and SAA). 
 275. Compare Flohr v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 745, 746 (N.D.N.Y. 1957) (“The 
[PVA] . . . permits the assertion of liability in admiralty against the United States where the negligence 
of its agents has caused personal injury.”), and Canadian Transp. Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 
1093 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“The [PVA] . . . gives the district courts jurisdiction over tort claims 
involving public vessels.”), with Uralde v. United States, 614 F.3d 1282, 1285–86 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(stating that mere involvement of a public vessel is not enough to trigger the PVA), and Hurd v. United 
States, 134 F. Supp. 2d 745, 767 (D.S.C. 2001), aff’d, 34 F. App’x 77 (4th Cir. 2002) (deeming a failure 
to rescue claim against Coast Guard governed exclusively by SAA). 
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vessels are cognizable under the PVA in some circuits, while other 
circuits entertain such claims under the SAA.276 Close cases are even 
treated dissimilarly within the same jurisdiction.277 Finally, 
international practice at the time Congress adopted the PVA provides 
little direction.278 Such confusion is hardly representative of the 
consistency the Founders sought to achieve by assigning admiralty 
jurisdiction to the federal courts,279 particularly given the frequency 
with which PVA claims involve noncitizens.280 
Fortunately, there is a way forward. Although Supreme Court 
decisions interpreting ambiguous statutes are well nigh final,281 
Calmar, American Stevedores, and Continental Tuna present no 
barriers to creating a workable, reliable standard.282 Luckily, it is 
																																																																																																																																
 276. Compare Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 951 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(“It is undisputed that contracts for the repair of United States government ships are governed by the 
provisions of the [SAA] . . . .”), and United States v. Loyola, 161 F.2d 126, 127 (9th Cir. 1947) (finding 
breach of contract action by seaman for maintenance and cure governed by the provisions of the PVA), 
with E.S.S. Lines, Inc. v. United States, 187 F.2d 956, 959 (1st Cir. 1951) (finding PVA to have “no 
applicability to a contract claim” seeking payment of costs related to rehabilitating a private vessel after 
bareboat charter to government for use as warship). 
 277. See Geertson v. United States, 223 F.2d 68, 70–71 (3d Cir. 1955) (holding that the PVA applies 
when a Coast Guard crew is negligent in towage operation); P. Dougherty Co. v. United States, 207 F.2d 
626, 634 (3d Cir. 1953) (finding a claim against the United States for crew’s negligence in rescue 
operation involving towage is not cognizable). 
 278. The House and Senate reports identify the influence of principal maritime nations, namely 
England, France, and Germany, on promulgation of the PVA. H.R. REP. NO. 68-913, at 15 (1924) 
(“[S]ince it is the established practice of the principal maritime nations, notably England, France, and 
Germany, to permit their nationals and foreigners to sue in their tribunals for damages caused by public 
vessels, this bill would bring American practice into conformity, substantially, with that of these 
countries.”). England permitted suit at the time for collision damages and would answer if shown that 
“the public vessel, through her navigators, was at fault.” Id. at 5. English practice regarding salvage 
claims is mentioned, but other claims involving contracts or crewmember negligence merely involving 
public vessels are not. See id. at 5, 15–16. As to French and German practice, contract and tort suits 
against the government were recognized, but jurisdiction of the separate claims fell to different courts 
within each country. Id. at 5–6, 16. The Reports highlight what appears to be a discretionary function 
distinction in France and Germany, where the government could not be held liable for injuries 
caused by its agents in the collection of taxes, while it would be if a ship were injured by 
the negligence of the officers of one of its men-of-war. An example of the purely 
personal act of one of its agents for which the Government would not be responsible 
would be found in the case of theft by him. 
Id. at 16. 
 279. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 280. See, e.g., Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 2011) (Ecuadorian plaintiffs); 
Uralde v. United States, 614 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2010) (Cuban plaintiffs); Taghadomi v. United 
States, 401 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2005) (Iranian plaintiffs). 
 281. Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 232, at 630. 
 282. See discussion infra Part III. 
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unnecessary to create new PVA jurisprudence from whole cloth. 
Instead, common sense and the lessons of nearly a century of PVA-
related developments in the law encourage a simple reaffirmation of 
existing principles. In the end, an across-the-board strict 
interpretation of the PVA will improve application of the federal 
waiver of sovereign immunity in the admiralty context, while also 
preserving its limited scope as intended by the 68th Congress. 
III. SALVAGING THE PUBLIC VESSELS ACT: CHARTING A NEW 
COURSE 
Putting the PVA back on course requires a strict interpretation of 
its terms.283 Properly applied, the PVA does not provide a waiver of 
sovereign immunity for claims merely involving public vessels.284 
Indeed, something more is required; though recent Eleventh Circuit 
decisions help identify exactly what this “something more” entails, 
an orderly and explicit analytical framework will prove useful to 
courts considering admiralty claims against the government.285 This 
analytical framework would limit Supreme Court decisions to their 
specific holdings, promote the original legislative intent, and 
incorporate the logic of Eleventh Circuit decisions.286 When facing a 
PVA claim, courts should primarily consider: (1) the nature of the 
																																																																																																																																
 283. See Marine Coatings of Ala. v. United States, 71 F.3d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir. 1996) (discussing 
need to strictly construe the PVA). 
 284. See Uralde, 614 F.3d at 1286 (identifying the PVA as the proper statute when damages are 
caused directly by a public vessel or negligent navigation thereof and the SAA as the proper statute 
when a public vessel is merely involved). 
 285. See generally id.; Marine Coatings, 71 F.3d 1558. Unlike the proposal found in Raley, supra 
note 21, and notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s refusal to do so when previously presented with the 
opportunity, this Note does seek to provide a framework that can be used to “expressly delineate what 
claims fall under the PVA.” See Raley, supra note 21, at 450 n.130. 
 286. Thus, under the proposed framework, Canadian Aviator, American Stevedores, Continental 
Tuna, Marine Coatings, and Uralde were correctly decided under the PVA. However, Tobar, 
Taghadomi, and Thomason were all incorrectly decided. Tobar, to the extent that the Coast Guard vessel 
towed a private vessel back to Ecuador and allegedly caused damage to live cargo, comes dangerously 
close to qualifying under the PVA. But, properly construed, “damages” under the PVA should directly 
result from physical contact with the public vessel, its appurtenances, or some other object (such as a 
submerged shipwreck). By limiting the term “in the operation of” to traditional navigation and 
maintenance functions, and limiting the term “damages” to include only those that arise from contact 
with another object, the PVA remains within the bounds originally intended by its proponents and later 
refined by the Supreme Court. 
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proceedings; (2) the character of the damages; and (3) the role of the 
vessel in causing the claimed damages. 
In any PVA analysis, the threshold question must involve the 
nature of the proceedings. First, and quite obviously, there must be a 
suit against the United States.287 If the United States is not named as 
a defendant, the PVA does not apply.288 Second, the claim must 
invoke the admiralty jurisdiction.289 Other land-based statutes, such 
as the FTCA and the Tucker Act, waive sovereign immunity for dry 
torts committed by the government.290 Lastly, a public vessel of the 
United States must be involved,291 or the PVA on its face does not 
apply.292 
Next, a court should consider the nature of the claimed damages. 
Because other statutes offer exclusive remedies, a court must first 
ensure that some other statute, such as FECA, does not specifically 
address the class of alleged damages.293 If the PVA is not preempted 
by another statute, a court should consider whether the damages 
sound in contract or tort.294 If the damages sound in contract, the 
claim survives under the PVA only if expressly enumerated in 
§ 31102(a)(2); in short, it must involve “compensation for towage 
and salvage services, including contract salvage.”295 Other general 
claims sounding in contract, such as those involving maritime liens, 
fall squarely within the exclusive province of the SAA and must be 
brought pursuant to its terms.296 Finally, if the damages sound in tort, 
the class of claims potentially cognizable under the PVA involves 
either personal injury297 or property damage.298 Though the 
																																																																																																																																
 287. 46 U.S.C. § 31102(a) (2006). 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id.; see also supra note 44 (detailing the admiralty jurisdiction analysis). 
 290. See supra notes 47–50. 
 291. § 31102(a)(1)–(2); see also supra note 60 (describing definition of “public vessel”). 
 292. § 31102(a)(1)–(2). 
 293. See discussion supra note 135. Similarly, a court must ensure the complaint is not barred by 
some other rule, such as the Feres Doctrine. See discussion supra note 136. 
 294. See, e.g., Am. Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947) (suit for personal injury sounding 
in tort); Marine Coatings of Ala. v. United States, 71 F.3d 1558 (11th Cir. 1996) (suit for maritime lien 
sounding in contract). 
 295. Marine Coatings, 71 F.3d at 1564; see also discussion supra Part II.B. 
 296. Marine Coatings, 71 F.3d at 1564. 
 297. Am. Stevedores, 330 U.S. at 448 (personal injury). 
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distinction is legally insignificant after American Stevedores (both 
types of injury are cognizable under the PVA), it is analytically 
helpful to distinguish personal injury and property damage when 
identifying any causal nexus between a public vessel and claimed 
damages. 
In the end, a court faces its most difficult question under the 
Damages Provision: whether the public vessel actually caused the 
claimed damages.299 These claims tend to fall into one of two 
categories: collision300 and noncollision301 cases. The former 
category is ready-made for the PVA. When a public vessel strikes 
another vessel or person and causes personal injury or property 
damage, the PVA waiver of sovereign immunity is triggered—
assuming some prima facie fault lies with the government.302 
Similarly, when the crew of a public vessel is negligent in the 
navigation or operation of a public vessel, and such negligence 
causes personal injury or property damage, the PVA should apply.303 
Here, the term “in the operation of” should be limited to the simple 
navigation and movement of the public vessel.304 Finally, the PVA 
waiver of sovereign immunity should apply when an appurtenance or 
cargo of a public vessel falls or otherwise strikes and causes personal 
injury or property damage as a result of the negligence of a 
crewmember in navigation or physical maintenance of the vessel, its 
appurtenances, or cargo.305 
																																																																																																																																
 298. Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 216–17 (1945) (property damage). 
 299. See 46 U.S.C. § 31102(a)(1) (2006). 
 300. E.g., United States v. United Cont’l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164 (1976). 
 301. E.g., Canadian Aviator, 324 U.S. 215. 
 302. United Cont’l Tuna, 425 U.S. at 181 (reaffirming that collision cases fall under PVA). 
 303. Canadian Aviator, 324 U.S. at 224–25 (extending PVA to cases where “the negligence of the 
personnel of a public vessel in the operation of the vessel causes damage to other ships, their cargoes, 
and personnel, regardless of physical contact between the two ships”). 
 304. See id. (suggesting a direct link between the operation and movement of an offending vessel and 
claimed damages). Cf. Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that the 
relevant operation is not merely the movement of the public vessel itself but the crewmembers’ search 
and seizure of the plaintiff’s vessel on the high seas). 
 305. See Am. Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 453–54 (1947) (extending PVA to personal 
injury actions resulting from falling beam onboard public vessel). 
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Contrariwise, the PVA should not apply to claims merely 
involving public vessels.306 The traditional personification doctrine 
supports holding the United States liable for damages directly caused 
by a public vessel as a result of negligent navigation or physical 
maintenance by crewmembers.307 But, given the plain meaning of the 
statute and the legislative record, the mere involvement of a public 
vessel does not satisfy the required causal nexus when an 
independent actor causes damage—even though the actor may make 
use of a public vessel in doing so.308 A claim merely involves a 
public vessel—and therefore should not be allowed under the PVA—
when the claim does not otherwise qualify for jurisdiction under the 
PVA as outlined above and the claimed damages result from 
independent acts, decisions, or omissions on the part of the crew 
unrelated to traditional navigation, movement, or maintenance of a 
public vessel.309 
Although circumstances vary, the PVA generally should not waive 
sovereign immunity for alleged noncollision damages when: (1) the 
offending vessel and all of its appurtenances were motionless;310 (2) 
the crewmembers alleged to be responsible for the harm have 
																																																																																																																																
 306. See, e.g., Uralde v. United States, 614 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 307. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 308. See discussion supra Parts II.B, II.C.1. When considering the limits of the PVA, causation 
principles such as direct and proximate cause are somewhat helpful. See generally SCHOENBAUM, supra 
note 4, at 105–11. But, traditional causation doctrine focuses on ordinary legal persons as actors, and the 
language becomes hopelessly confused when applied in the PVA context. See id. For example, 
proximate cause requires foreseeability: “the injury or damage must be a reasonably probable 
consequence of the defendant’s act or omission.” Id. at 107. But, are all injuries and damages merely 
involving a public vessel foreseeable? Surely this offends the limiting principle embodied in the theory 
of proximate cause. See id. at 107–08. And what acts or omissions should a court consider? Those of the 
public vessel or her operators? Both? 
 309. See Uralde, 614 F.3d at 1286 (stating that when crewmembers of a public vessel are “negligent 
in performing functions other than those ‘in the operation of’ public vessels, the claims arising from 
those acts fall under the SAA, rather than the PVA”); Marine Coatings of Ala. v. United States, 71 F.3d 
1558, 1563–64 (11th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a sweeping waiver based on the mere involvement of a public 
vessel); supra note 303 (presenting “in the operation of” rule as defined in Canadian Aviator). The term 
“maintenance,” for example, would include mechanical upkeep or the placement and movement of 
items aboard the vessel. A claim for personal injury or property damage caused by an explosion aboard 
a public vessel due to negligent maintenance would involve “damages caused by a public vessel.” See, 
e.g., Gibbs v. United States, 94 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1950) (explosion). 
 310. Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 225 (1945) (emphasis added) (“There 
seems no logical reason for allowing recovery for collision and refusing recovery for damages caused by 
other movements of the offending vessel.”). 
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disembarked or otherwise departed the public vessel;311 (3) the 
claimed damages resulted from an omission unrelated to the simple 
navigation and movement or physical maintenance of the public 
vessel;312 (4) the claimed damages resulted from willful or reckless 
conduct of a crewmember unrelated to the simple navigation and 
movement or physical maintenance of the public vessel;313 or (5) the 
aggrieved vessel did not physically strike anything and the offending 
public vessel or its appurtenances did not cause, as a result of direct 
physical contact, any personal injury or property damage.314 
Employing these factors, and aided by a rebuttable presumption 
against waiver in noncollision cases (as the 68th Congress would 
likely have it),315 courts can uniformly and consistently apply the 
PVA to admiralty claims against the government. Fortunately, for 
those claims rejected by the PVA there is likely life on the other side 
under the SAA.316 
																																																																																																																																
 311. Uralde, 614 F.3d at 1287–88 (finding the PVA did not apply when a Coast Guard crew left the 
public vessel and boarded a private vessel to give medical assistance); Mid-S. Holding Co. v. United 
States, 225 F.3d 1201, 1202–03 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding the SAA applied to a claim ultimately barred 
by the discretionary function exception when a Coast Guard crew boarded a private vessel during 
interdiction and unplugged the bilge pump power cord, causing the vessel to sink); see also Raley, supra 
note 21, at 464 (proposing to resolve the confusion surrounding the PVA by encouraging the Supreme 
Court to hold, at its next opportunity, that the Damages Provision is not applicable “where a crew from a 
government-owned vessel causes damage to a private vessel, or its personnel, while aboard the private 
vessel”). 
 312. Uralde, 614 F.3d at 1286–88 (suggesting the PVA applies to failure to rescue claim). Contra 
Taghadomi v. United States, 401 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2005) (suggesting the SAA applies to failure to 
rescue claim). 
 313. See, e.g., Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 168–69 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(finding that either the PVA or SAA applied when drunken seaman turned wheels on drydock wall and 
caused Coast Guard vessel to fall from and damage drydock). In a similar vein, the intentional shooting 
of another individual from aboard a public vessel would not occur “in the operation of” a public vessel 
as defined herein. See discussion supra note 309. 
 314. See Am. Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 449, 454 (1947); Canadian Aviator, 324 U.S. 
at 224–25. Of course, courts should also consider the discretionary function exception. See discussion 
supra note 81. But, claims subject to abrogation under a discretionary function exception might not be 
good candidates for jurisdiction under the PVA in the first place. See supra notes 309–13 and 
accompanying text. 
 315. See discussion supra Part II.D. Such a presumption could be overcome by showing the facts of 
the case fit squarely within the limited holdings of Canadian Aviator (navigation and movement) or 
American Stevedores (contact with a public vessel or its appurtenances). 
 316. See discussion supra Part II.C.3. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Founders decided more than two hundred years ago to 
incorporate the ancient customs of admiralty and maritime law into 
their new government.317 Hoping to achieve consistency and 
reliability, especially in an area of law likely to involve noncitizens, 
they assigned the federal courts jurisdiction over all claims sounding 
in admiralty.318 In the 1920s, a burgeoning republic on its way to 
becoming the world’s predominate force decided to shed its 
sovereign armor and entertain admiralty suits against the 
government.319 However nearsighted and haphazard Congress’s 
statutory scheme may seem today, courts are left with a choice 
between two statutes in most admiralty suits against the government: 
the PVA or the SAA.320 Because of the circuit disagreement, varying 
venue provisions, and the PVA’s reciprocity requirement, this choice 
often involves unnecessary delay and cost; extended argument and 
appeal over jurisdiction displaces more important discussion of 
liability and compensation.321 
Reliability and consistency concerns alone demand a nationwide 
resolution of this issue, not only to encourage judicial efficiency and 
reduce the risk of forum shopping, but also to honor the original 
intent of the PVA’s proponents, the plain language of the statute, and 
the limited nature of Supreme Court holdings involving the PVA.322 
Most importantly, the PVA must be viewed alongside its “sister 
statute,” the SAA.323 Removal of the Merchant Vessel Proviso from 
the SAA in 1960 enlarged the claims cognizable under the SAA, but 
did nothing to alter the type of claims originally (and still) cognizable 
under the PVA.324 Often, courts broaden the scope of a sovereign 
																																																																																																																																
 317. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 318. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 319. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
 320. See discussion supra Part I.C–D. 
 321. See supra note 119 (detailing the lengthy procedural history of Marine Coatings). 
 322. See discussion supra Part II.B–E. 
 323. See discussion supra Part I.C–D. 
 324. See discussion supra Part II.C.2–3. 
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immunity waiver to ensure compensation for deserving victims.325 
However, a broad construction of the PVA actually results in more 
limited access to the courts.326 Because suits rejected by the terms of 
the PVA will often lie under the more generous waiver contained in 
the SAA, it is simply unnecessary to stretch the PVA beyond its 
natural bounds. 
By interpreting the PVA strictly and allowing suit only in those 
cases involving enumerated contract claims (i.e., towage and salvage 
claims) and cases where the public vessel plainly and directly caused 
personal injury or property damage (i.e., the public vessel was more 
than merely involved), the federal waiver of sovereign immunity in 
the admiralty context becomes workable. In the end, a strict 
interpretation not only increases access to the courts and streamlines 
choice of venue under another duly enacted and amended statute (the 
SAA), it also permits the words of the PVA to “mean what they say” 
and at once calms all of the trouble lurking beneath the surface for 
plaintiffs suing the United States government in admiralty. 
  
																																																																																																																																
 325. See cases cited supra note 34. 
 326. See supra note 262. 
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TABLE 1: COMPARING THE PVA AND THE SAA327 
 Public Vessels Act Suits in Admiralty Act 
Sovereign immunity 
waived under what 
circumstances? 
For “damages caused by a 
public vessel” or for 
“compensation for towage 
and salvage services, 
including contract salvage, 
rendered to a public vessel” 
If the “vessel were privately 
owned or operated, or if cargo 
were privately owned or 
possessed, or if a private person 
or property were involved, a civil 
action in admiralty could be 
maintained” 
Suit in personam 
against the U.S.? 
Yes Yes 
Reciprocity required 




Two years Two years 
Allows seizure of 
U.S. vessels/cargo? 
No No 
Allows trial by jury? No No 
Venue? 
A district court where “any 
plaintiff resides or has an 
office” or, if no resident 
plaintiff, “in . . . any district” 
A district court where “any 
plaintiff resides or has its 
principal place of business; or 
[where] the vessel . . . is found” 
Subpoena 
provisions? 
Prohibits subpoena of crew 
without consent of “master or 
commanding officer” 
No such provision 
Allows costs and 
interest? 
Allows costs but no pre-
judgment interest unless 
provided for by contract 
Allows costs and post-filing, pre-
judgment interest 
Incorporates 
provisions of the 
other statute? 
Yes, the PVA incorporates 
SAA provisions not 
inconsistent with its terms 
No, the SAA does not 




 327. Table 1 is adapted from selected provisions of the PVA and the SAA; it compares many—but 
not all—of the most important parts of each statute. See Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 31101–31112 
(2006); Suits in Admiralty Act, id. §§ 30901–30918. 
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